The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Mr Rycroft
replied to Mr Brummell on 15 March:
“This is to
confirm that it is indeed the Prime Minister’s unequivocal
view
that Iraq
is in further material breach of its obligations, as in OP4
[operative
paragraph
4] of UNSCR 1441, because of ‘false statements or omissions
in
the
declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and
failure to
comply
with, and co‑operate fully in the interpretation of, this
resolution’.”
•
Senior
Ministers should have considered the question posed in
Mr Brummell’s
letter of
14 March, either in the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee or
a
“War
Cabinet”, on the basis of formal advice. Such a Committee should
then
have
reported its conclusions to Cabinet before its Members were asked
to
endorse the
Government’s policy.
•
Cabinet was
provided with the text of Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer
to
Baroness
Ramsey setting out the legal basis for military
action.
•
That
document represented a statement of the Government’s legal position
–
it did not
explain the legal basis of the conclusion that Iraq had failed to
take
“the final
opportunity” to comply with its disarmament obligations offered
by
resolution
1441.
•
Cabinet was
not provided with written advice which set out, as the
advice
of 7 March
had done, the conflicting arguments regarding the legal effect
of
resolution
1441 and whether, in particular, it authorised military action
without
a further
resolution of the Security Council.
•
The advice
should have been provided to Ministers and senior officials
whose
responsibilities
were directly engaged and should have been made
available
to Cabinet.
811.
The following
key findings are from Section 6.1:
•
The size
and composition of a UK military contribution to the US‑led
invasion of
Iraq was
largely discretionary. The US wanted some UK capabilities
(including
Special
Forces), to use UK bases, and the involvement of the UK military
to
avoid the
perception of unilateral US military action. The primary impetus
to
maximise
the size of the UK contribution and the recommendations on
its
composition
came from the Armed Forces, with the agreement of
Mr Hoon.
•
From late
February 2002, the UK judged that Saddam Hussein’s regime
could
only be
removed by a US‑led invasion.
•
In April
2002, the MOD advised that, if the US mounted a major
military
operation,
the UK should contribute a division comprising three brigades.
That
was
perceived to be commensurate with the UK’s capabilities and the
demands
of the
campaign. Anything smaller risked being compared adversely to the
UK’s
contribution
to the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.
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