1.1 | UK Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000

383. Dr Blix added that it was his view that, as the IAEA and Special Commission

were acting “as organs of the Security Council” to contribute to “a common objective”,

it was “essential” that they had a “common approach”. The IAEA would continue “for

the time being … to suspend the practical implementation of its ongoing monitoring and

verification plan”.

384. On 2 November, Mr Nizar Hamdoon, Iraqi Permanent Representative to the UN,

reiterated Iraq’s decision on U-2 flights in a letter to Mr Butler.150 He wrote:

“In the light of current developments, Iraq anticipates that the United States will

engage in military aggression … as it has done on previous occasions. Accordingly,

the entry of a United States spy plane into Iraqi airspace cannot be accepted. We

therefore urge you to cancel the overflights scheduled … on 5 and 7 November.”

385. On 2 November, Mr Butler informed the President of the Security Council that two

UNSCOM personnel of US nationality had the previous day again been refused entry

by Iraq.151

386. In further letters on 4 and 5 November, Mr Butler reported that US personnel in

UNSCOM inspection teams had been denied access to Iraqi facilities, and that dual-use

equipment had been moved without authorisation.152

387. In his memoir, Mr Annan wrote that in November 1997 he had “personally stepped

into the Iraq quagmire for the first time”.153 He had known “full well” that his “interventions

would be met with suspicion and manoeuvring on all sides”. He had appointed three

senior diplomats to engage the Iraqis:

“Baghdad … was clearly determined to re-engage the UN at a senior level, namely

with me as Secretary-General, and it had made its negotiating position clear: it

was not seeking confrontation; it had implemented all Security Council resolutions

without receiving adequate respect for its sovereignty, integrity, and security;

and that one member state – the United States – was using UNSCOM for its

own purposes.”

150 UN Security Council, 2 November 1997, ‘Letter dated 2 November 1997 from the Permanent

Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Executive Chairman of the Special

Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council

resolution 689 (1991)’ (S/1997/837).

151 UN Security Council, 3 November 1997, ‘Letter dated 2 November 1997 from the Executive Chairman

of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of

Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/1997/836).

152 UN Security Council, 4 November 1997, ‘Letter dated 4 November 1997 from the Executive Chairman

of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of

Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/1997/843);

UN Security Council, 5 November 1997, ‘Letter dated 5 November from the Executive Chairman of the

Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security

Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/1997/851).

153 Annan K. Interventions: A Life In War And Peace. Allen Lane, 2012.

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