6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
1117.
A JIC
Assessment of Iraq’s military options on 6 December confirmed
that
a massive
coalition ground force would be required to be certain of
toppling
Saddam
Hussein and highlighted the possibility of Iraqi attacks on
Coalition
Forces in
the event of a phased start to a military campaign.
1118.
At the request
of the MOD, the JIC evaluated Iraq’s military capabilities and
“what
military
options Iraq has, and which it is likely to pursue a) during
Coalition air strikes
and b)
during a Coalition ground attack”.440
1119.
In the JIC
discussion on 4 December, the draft was described as “an
important
paper which
highlighted the gaps in our knowledge”. The judgements were
based
“largely on
a mixture of observation and past experience”, but the Assessment
“did not
quite do
justice to the intelligence”; the judgements “could be made more
confidently”.
The
Assessment needed to bring out more clearly the risks of a phased
attack and
unpack the
risks involved in possible scenarios, such as the possible use of
CBW
before
Coalition Forces were properly assembled and urban fighting:
“Nothing short of
a massive
deployment would guarantee overthrowing the
regime.”441
1120.
In the
Assessment issued on 6 December, the JIC’s Key Judgements
were:
•
Saddam
Hussein would “initially seek international pressure to halt
Coalition
[military]
action”. If that failed, he would “seek to inflict serious
casualties on
Iraq’s
neighbours and on coalition forces in order to undermine the
Coalition’s
will to
fight on”.
•
Saddam
Hussein “would use chemical and biological weapons (CBW) if
he
faced
defeat. He might also use them earlier in a conflict, including
against
coalition
forces, neighbouring states and his own people. Israel could be
his
first target.”
•
Iraq had
“contingency plans to weather coalition air strikes while
maintaining
government
control over the country. Iraq’s integrated air defence system
would
be
overloaded by an all‑out Coalition attack and would quickly become
far less
effective
…”
•
“A ground
attack might fracture Saddam’s regime, but only a massive
Coalition
force is
guaranteed to topple him. The smaller the initial Coalition force,
the
more likely
Iraqi forces are to resist. A phased Coalition attack could allow
Iraq to
claim
military successes.”
•
“If the
Special Republican Guard and Republican Guard [RG] remained
loyal
and
effective they could inflict serious casualties on Coalition Forces
in urban
warfare.”
440
JIC
Assessment, 6 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Options’.
441
Minutes, 4
December 2002, JIC meeting.
343