3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

Dr Blix added that, as he understood “several Council members are interested in the

working document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues, we have declassified

it and are ready to make it available to members of the Council on request”. It provided “a

more up-to-date review of the outstanding issues”; and each cluster ended “with a number

of points indicating what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq’s co-operation could

be measured against the successful resolution of issues.”

1091. Dr Blix concluded that “co-operation can and is to be immediate”, but

“disarmament and … verification … cannot be instant”. “Even with a pro-active Iraqi

attitude” it would still take “months” to “verify sites and items, analyse documents,

interview relevant persons and draw conclusions”.

1092. Dr ElBaradei reported that there were no indications that Iraq had resumed

nuclear activities since the inspectors left in December 1998 and the recently

increased level of Iraqi co-operation should allow the IAEA to provide the Security

Council with an assessment of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities in the near future.

1093. Dr ElBaradei reported that the IAEA was focused on the “central question”

of “whether Iraq has revived, or attempted to revive, its defunct nuclear weapons

programme over the last four years”.342 Dr ElBaradei noted that:

“… in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure by the

international community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its co-operation, particularly

with regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence

that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern.”

1094. That “should enable” the IAEA “in the very near future to provide the Security

Council with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq’s nuclear‑related

capabilities”.

1095. The key points made by Dr ElBaradei are set out in the Box below.

Iraq’s industrial capacity had deteriorated sharply, including through the departure

of foreign support present in the 1980s and large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel

in the preceding decade.

Interviews were continuing, including two “private interviews in the last 10 days”.

Interviews outside Iraq might be the best way to ensure that interviews were “free”,

and the IAEA intended to request such interviews “shortly”.

342 UN Security Council, ‘4714th Meeting Friday 7 March 2003’ (S/PV.4714).

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