The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequately and properly assessed and

whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications”, including three of the

statements made in the Foreword.369

682. In relation to the statement in Mr Blair’s Foreword that he believed Iraq, and its

weapons of mass destruction, was “a current and serious threat to the UK national

interest”, the ISC stated:

“On the question of what direct threat Saddam, his regime and his WMD posed

to UK interests, the evidence is that UK forces deployed in the region to enforce

the … No-Fly Zones were threatened by conventional weapons, and could have

been threatened by any biological and chemical weapons that Saddam possessed.

Additionally, if Al Hussein missiles had been retained and they were operational

with conventional or chemical and biological warheads, they could have attacked

UK forces in Cyprus or those conducting operations in the region. Saddam’s WMD

programmes and his continued support of them increased this threat.”370

683. The ISC stated that the first draft of Mr Blair’s Foreword had made clear that

the Government recognised that Saddam Hussein did not pose a direct threat to the

UK: “The case I make is not that Saddam could launch a nuclear attack on London

or another part of the UK (He could not).”371

684. In the ISC’s view, it was “unfortunate” that the point was removed in the

published version, “and not highlighted elsewhere”.

685. The ISC concluded:

“Saddam was not considered a current or imminent threat to mainland UK, nor did

the dossier say so.”372

686. In its response to the ISC, the Government welcomed that conclusion, adding:

“The dossier was not intended to make the case for military action against Iraq;

it was intended to share with the public the intelligence being presented to the

Government which (along with much open source information) showed that Iraq

was in serious breach of several UNSCRs.”373

369 Letter Taylor to Blair, 9 September 2003, [untitled]. Published in Intelligence and Security Committee,

Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments, September 2003, Cm5972.

370 Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and

Assessments, September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 82.

371 Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and

Assessments, September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 83.

372 Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and

Assessments, September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 111.

373 Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass

Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments, 11 September 2003, February 2004, Cm6118, paragraph 14.

246