The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

349. Dr Blix told Mr Blair that Iraq had two “fears”:

• Once the inspectors returned there would be a “a stand‑off over access which

the US would take as a casus belli”.

• UNMOVIC would “inherit UNSCOM’s leakiness” which had “discredited

UNSCOM”.

350. Dr Blix said that he would support stronger inspections if that was the decision

of the Security Council. Whatever arrangements were agreed, there would be limits

to what inspections could achieve: “For instance, it would be very hard to catch Iraq’s

mobile installations.”

351. Dr Blix also warned Mr Blair that UNMOVIC would need a couple of months to

prepare and 60 days thereafter for “rebaselining”: “So it would be nearly four months

before the inspectors could present the issues to the UNSC.”

352. President Putin told Mr Blair that he had great doubts about the legality of

the use of military force, but was prepared to work to achieve a UN resolution

which would convince Iraq to readmit inspectors on terms which had been agreed

in the Security Council.

353. In a telephone conversation on 6 September, President Putin stated that he

thought the Russian and UK approaches were “very close”:

• both were insisting on the return of inspectors in accordance with UN Security

Council resolutions;

• Foreign Ministers were working with a close understanding; and

• we had to be 100 percent sure that Iraq would never produce

WMD programmes.111

354. Russia had been working with Iraq to ensure that it understood, and the Iraqi

Foreign Minister had confirmed in Moscow earlier that week that it was prepared to

discuss the return of “UN structures”. Iraq was prepared to allow UN inspectors and

monitoring to return; we had to ensure that was on our conditions. Russia had to be

involved in developing those conditions or it would not be possible for it to subscribe to

those “rules”. Mr Blair agreed.

355. President Putin told Mr Blair that Russia had great doubts about the legality of the

use of military force and all diplomatic means were far from exhausted: “But he thought

it would be possible for the UN Security Council to come up with a common position, to

ensure that the Iraqis saw that they had no way out.”

111 Letter Rycroft to Sedwill, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Telephone Call with President Putin,

6 September’.

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