The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Iraq.85
He warned
of the need for “a plan to address the humanitarian
consequences”
if military
action were to force the withdrawal of UN and NGO staff and
suggested that
the
information campaign to make the case for war should “highlight our
commitment to
helping the
Iraqi people before, during and after any action”.
129.
Mr John
Sawers, British Ambassador to Egypt, who had been closely
associated
with the
development of the UK’s policy on Iraq as Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary for
Foreign
Affairs, responded to Mr Goulty’s minute with a teleletter to Sir
Michael Jay and
senior
colleagues offering his views on the direction of
policy.86
130.
In Mr Sawers’
view, the UK needed to say “clearly and consistently that our goal
is
Regime
Change – for the sake of stability in the Middle East, for the
Iraqi people, and for
the goal of
controlling the spread of WMD”.
131.
Mr Sawers
argued that:
“… by
associating ourselves with Bush’s heartfelt objective of seeing
Saddam
removed, we
will be given more houseroom in Washington to ask the
awkward
questions
about how.
“And there
are many such questions. What is the plan? How long would it take
for
a direct
confrontation to succeed? How do we retain the support of our
regional
friends
meanwhile? … If we were to build up the Kurds and Shia as proxies,
what
assurances
would we have to give them that we would not let them down
yet
again? How
would we keep the Iranians from meddling? How do we preserve
Iraq’s
territorial
integrity …? How would we provide for stability after Saddam and
his
cronies
were killed?”
132.
On 27
February, Mr Webb warned Mr Hoon of the importance of establishing
clear
strategic
objectives before taking a decision on military action against
Iraq.87
In
advice
on possible
responses to President Bush’s State of the Union address, he
cautioned
against
ruling out UK participation in military action against Iraq, “if
that is the only way to
stem the
tide of WMD proliferation and a worthwhile and legal option exists
at the time”.
Mr Webb
added:
“Before
assessing military options we should need to be clear about the
strategic
objectives
…
“It is not
easy to see the satisfactory end states which should be the
objective of
military
operations.”
133.
A JIC
Assessment of 27 February reached the view that, without
direct
intervention
on the ground, the Iraqi opposition would be unable to
overthrow
Saddam
Hussein’s regime (see Section 6.1).
85
Minute
Goulty to Fry, 20 February 2002, ‘Military Action Against Iraq:
Issues’.
86
Teleletter
Sawers to Jay, 21 February 2002, ‘Iraq: Policy’.
87
Minute Webb
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 27 February 2002, ‘Axis of
Evil’.
136