The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

806.  The FCO and MOD argued for “a long-term UK commitment in Iraq”, which would

include influencing the Iraqi Government and supporting the long-term development of

its capacity, in particular through the provision of advice to ministries in Baghdad.

807.  The 19 July meeting of NSID(OD) was cancelled and not reinstated.463

808.  On 11 July, a DFID official sent Mr Simon McDonald, Mr Brown’s Foreign Policy

Adviser, a draft letter for Mr Brown to send to Prime Minister Maliki.464

809.  The draft letter reflected guidance from Mr Alexander that the UK should be

realistic about the role of economic reform and only propose initiatives that had a good

chance of being realised.465

810.  Mr McDonald passed the draft letter to Mr Brown on 27 July, after consulting the

FCO and the British Embassy Baghdad.466 Mr McDonald commented that the approach

set out in the draft letter was:

“… sensible and realistic but not particularly ambitious … But the Embassy argue

that, taking into account the security situation and the lack of political will … this is

as much as we would be able to get Maliki to consider.”

811.  Mr Brown wrote to Prime Minister Maliki on 29 July.467 While establishing security

remained the “abiding priority”, it was vital that people were given a stake in their future.

Mr Brown suggested that the UK could help the Iraqi Government to:

• secure a new IMF Stand By Arrangement by the end of 2007;

• develop an integrated energy strategy, alongside the World Bank;

• reform the banking sector, also alongside the World Bank;

• strengthen financial management, by continuing to fund an economic reform

team; and

• establish the BIPA to identify and promote investment opportunities throughout

the province. The UK had allocated funds to help establish the Agency. If

successful, it could be replicated in other Provinces and inform the creation of a

National Investment Commission.

812.  Mr Brown told the Inquiry:

“… if you can show people that their economic prosperity is possible, then the risks

of returning to violence are seen by people to be too great to put at risk something

that they were now about to enjoy. So I wanted to show in Basra … that the chance

463  Minute Cabinet Office to NSID(OD) members, 11 February 2010 [sic], ‘Ministerial Meeting on Iraq,

Cancellation Note’.

464  Letter DFID [junior official] to McDonald, 11 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Economic Initiative’.

465  Minute DFID [junior official] to PS [Alexander], 11 July 2007, ‘Iraq: ‘Economic Initiative’ – Prime

Minister’s Letter to Prime Minster Maliki’.

466  Minute McDonald to Prime Minister, 27 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Economic Initiative’.

467  Letter Brown to Maliki, 29 July 2007, [untitled].

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