The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1237.
The Chiefs of
Staff were invited to agree that participation in the land
campaign
was
“consistent with UK objectives” and to endorse the “approach to the
delivery of a
heavy or
light land package”.
1238.
Lt Gen Reith
advised that a UK contribution from the North remained
the
preferred
course of action; but the “constraints of Op FRESCO dictate that
the best force
package
available is based on a divisional headquarters and a single high
readiness UK
brigade”,
with a second brigade provided by the US. The disadvantage would be
that it
would lack
manoeuvre capability.
1239.
The UK could
not deploy a heavy force to the South quickly enough to meet
the
expected US
timeline for the start of offensive operations, and “a UK
contribution for
Phase 3
combat operations could only be achieved by light
forces”.
1240.
Lt Gen Reith
added:
“The UK
could mount two light brigades, potentially commanded at divisional
level,
although
the US would prefer to deploy them separately under US
control.”
1241.
Lt Gen Reith
advised the Chiefs of Staff that the heavy and light force
options
were
“mutually exclusive”; and that a decision on which to deploy was
“wholly dependent
on
confirmation of the Turkish position and must be made no later than
15 Jan[uary] …
to allow
the light force to be generated in time”.
1242.
In the
detailed paper, Lt Gen Reith stated that the US plan for
the northern axis
had
“enhanced the role of the UK division” and the UK’s tactical
analysis confirmed that
a minimum
of two brigades would be required for the northern
option.
1243.
The
constraints of Op FRESCO and the likely US timetable meant that
the
best option
the UK could provide comprised a divisional headquarters, an
armoured
brigade of
four battlegroups, a manoeuvre support task force (MSTF) built
around a
second
brigade headquarters with combat support elements, and the 2nd
Light Cavalry
Regiment
offered by the US. That would require the deployment of “circa
30,000”
UK personnel.
1244.
If Turkey did
not co‑operate and the UK still wished “to make a significant
and
early
contribution to operations against Iraq”, the UK could deploy two
light brigades and
possibly a
divisional headquarters for the southern axis.
1245.
One light
brigade would be based on an expanded ATG, comprising
the
Headquarters
of 3 Commando Brigade and “up to three battalions”. The
headquarters
and one
commando group (based on 40 Commando Group) could be in place by
the
end of
February. The remaining units would be deployed by
air.
1246.
A second
brigade would be based on 16 Air Assault Brigade, with up to
three
battalions.
360