The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

point that intelligence was going to become part of the public justification for the known

US policy of regime change.

357. Mr Hoon told the Inquiry that he did not have a specific recollection of the meeting

but he did not recall it as a key meeting, rather it was part of an “iterative process”.144

358. Mr Hoon subsequently wrote that there was “a very full discussion of the relevant

issues” at the meeting, and that:

“Arguments both for and against UK involvement as well as relevant legal opinions

were set out and recorded in the minutes of the meeting. All of the reservations set

out in the summary prepared by my Private Office were fully debated in the meeting.

At such a meeting I would not have thought it necessary to repeat arguments

already made by others … unless there was some specific benefit in doing so.”145

359. Lord Wilson told the Inquiry that he didn’t think the meeting on 23 July had

“decided on much”. It had been a “taking stock” meeting, but what had struck him “was

that some of the language used implied that we were closer to military action than I had

imagined that we were”.146

360. Lord Wilson told the Inquiry that two elements of the meeting stood out in his

memory: First, there was “an underlying tension … between the Prime Minister and his

Foreign Secretary”. Mr Straw was “very much in the business of saying: ‘The crucial

thing is to get all this to the United Nations. That’s the way we are going to play it.

We are nowhere near military action at the minute. All the military things the military

are saying need to be seen in the political context.’” Mr Straw had been “pleading quite

strongly for the political nuances”; and that he was “working very hard to keep the

Prime Minister … focused on the United Nations and away from getting too … gung ho

about military action”.

361. Second, Lord Wilson remembered “quite vividly” that Lord Goldsmith:

“… gave his legal advice … which was you would need the authorisation of a United

Nations Security Council resolution if you were going to specifically undertake

military action and if you didn’t do that, his strong advice was that it was illegal to

take military action. The Prime Minister simply said ‘Well…’ and that’s it. I remember

thinking ‘There is an unresolved issue there’.”147

362. Lord Wilson, who remained the Cabinet Secretary until the beginning of September

2002, told the Inquiry that he had still been on duty during August 2002 and had taken

papers, but he could recall none on Iraq.148

144 Public hearing, 19 January 2010, pages 20-21.

145 Statement, 2 April 2015, paragraph 13.

146 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 37-38.

147 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, page 38.

148 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, page 35.

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