The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
556.
Mr Browne
had impressed upon everyone he met in Iraq the need to
announce
“a detailed
economic plan for Basra” to coincide with PIC in December. He
observed that
“If we are
to deliver, and we must, this will need dedicated and energetic UK
resource in
London,
Basra and Baghdad.”
557.
During his
stay in Baghdad, Mr Browne reported that Gen Petraeus
described
progress on
reconciling the disaffected as “quite extraordinary”. He considered
that:
“The phenomenon
that began amongst the Sunni in the Al Anbar but which is
now
reaching
out to the Shia too, is now of sufficient magnitude that the
Government of Iraq
has no
choice but to embrace it.”
558.
Mr Browne
raised the UK’s concerns about the renewal of resolution 1723
with
both Prime
Minister Maliki and Gen Petraeus. The latter’s view was that the
strategic
context had
now changed and that in order to secure its passage Prime Minister
Maliki
would have
to be able to tell the Council of Representatives that it would be
the final
resolution.
Mr Browne “left him in little doubt about the legal constraint
that the UK would
face in the
absence of the UNSCR”.
559.
On 31 October,
at the MOD’s request, the JIC examined the sustainability
of
the recent
down-turn in JAM attacks on MNF-I in Basra.263
It assessed
that a range
of factors
– including the withdrawal from the city centre, a number of
development
initiatives
coming on stream, Gen Mohan and Gen Jalil’s efforts to improve
ISF
performance
in the city – had “created an environment in which the evolving
negotiation
between
MND(SE) and [JAM1] was able to progress to a formal cease-fire
agreement in
early
August, which is still being observed”.
560.
The JIC judged
that:
“The
agreement with [JAM1] is fragile. It has hitherto focused on
linking a reduction
in attacks
on MNF to prisoner releases. Pressure for a more
broadly-based
negotiation
including economic and political elements is likely to grow rapidly
…”
561.
The JIC
assessed that the reduction in violence that had been negotiated
with
JAM1 could
be upset “by a number of players with potentially conflicting
interests”.
The JIC
considered that:
“… the
fractious nature of the Sadrist movement means we see a high risk
that …
[the]
initiative could become a pawn of infighting in Najaf.
“The
attitude of Muqtada
al-Sadr is
important, in public he had made a point of
consistently
opposing any contacts with ‘occupation forces’ and the Najaf
leadership
would be
unlikely to challenge an order from him …”
562.
The JIC judged
that al-Sadr was trying to move his movement towards a
more
conventional
role in Iraqi politics and might therefore see advantage in “an
initiative
263
JIC
Assessment, 31 October 2007, ‘Iraq: Risks to the Negotiation with
JAM in Basra’.
286