The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
do so for a
sustained period. Alternatively, the demonstrable lead that the ISF
have
taken could
be argued to have opened a window of opportunity for us to
reassess
the
mission. MNC-I think that the events of the last two weeks have
advanced the
campaign in
Iraq by eight months and we have to accept, albeit painfully, that
we
have become
somewhat irrelevant to the Iraqis now that they have access to
US
resources.
We suggested to you last month the need to change the mission here
to
a training
and economic mission … and we would argue that the time has come
to
decide to
do so and to fit that mission into a broader US structure in
southern Iraq …
Whatever,
we’re beyond a ‘patch up’ to preserve a Union Jack in Basra just to
look
good. We
will most definitely not look good if we can’t preserve whatever
may have
been
achieved in Basra and it slips back. We must only take on those
tasks that we
have the
resources to deliver.”
946.
Mr Prentice
told the Inquiry that, through the Charge of the
Knights,
Prime Minister
Maliki had asserted central government authority over Basra
and
turned
around the perception of Iraq drifting into renewed sectarian
conflict.468
It
had also
served to reprioritise Basra within the MNF campaign. Until Prime
Minister
Maliki
launched his initiative, Basra had never been the main
effort for either the Iraqi
Government
or the Americans. The impact of that shift in priorities was, in
Mr Prentice’s
view, a key
turning point.
947.
In an update
on 3 April, the British Embassy Office Basra commented that it
was
“clear that
the US … feels that we moved to PIC in Basra too
early”.469
948.
A Cabinet
Office minute containing briefing for a telephone call between
Mr Brown
and Prime
Minister Maliki on 3 April described one deliverable for the call
as “our
relationship
with Maliki starts to rebuild, and he feels he still has the UK’s
support”.470
949.
Cabinet Office
officials explained that Prime Minister Maliki had given the
UK
and US
“minimal notice of his intention to travel to Basra, and did not
consult at all on
his plan to
launch a major Iraqi-led offensive”. He had then blamed the UK for
lack
of support
when the ISF got into difficulties and excluded UK officers from
planning
meetings at
his headquarters in Basra Palace. The brief suggested that
Mr Brown
should
point out that “if UK planning staff had been involved from an
earlier stage,
we could
have done more – and more effectively”.
950.
The minute
said that the coalition had turned down a number of
“ill-thought-
through
Iraqi requests for combat support” but “with the full knowledge and
support
of General
Austin (Commander, Multi-National Corps)”. As the operation
continued,
MND(SE) had
expanded its involvement, providing air, surveillance, medical
and
logistical
support to the ISF, as well as limited direct and indirect fire
support.
468
Private
hearing, 15 June 2010, pages 40-41 and 48.
469
eGram
12617/08 Basra to FCO London, 3 April 2008, ‘Basra – Update 2
April: Changes on the Way’.
470
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 3 April 2008,
‘Iraq: Phone Call with
Prime Minister
Maliki, 3 April’.
358