The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• a “brain drain”. Militia violence and intimidation, which specifically targeted

middle-class Basrawis, had prompted many to leave, resulting in a shortage

of capable local entrepreneurs.564

963.  DFID deployed an aviation industry consultant to Basra International Airport on

11 June, with the long-term aim of achieving “international certification” within two

years.565 In the shorter term, the consultant aimed to raise the capacity of the airport

from four or five to 15 flights per day.

964.  Ms Hendrie and Mr Donal Brown, her successor as DFID Deputy Director Iraq,

visited Iraq from 13 to 22 June.566 Their report to Mr Anderson and DFID colleagues

focused on what could be done in the next 12 months (while there was likely still to be

a significant UK military presence) which would constitute “a reasonable package of

‘deliverables’” in Basra. Components of that package included:

• Basra International Airport. There was “some confusion” over what the UK

could deliver. International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) accreditation was

done at a country level rather than for an individual airport (so the UK could not

hand over an accredited airport). Support for the airport was a joint DFID/MOD

responsibility.

• Completion of Pumping Station 2 and the water towers. The last two of DFID’s

infrastructure projects in the South, their completion would “go some way toward

demonstration that the UK has done something for the people of southern Iraq”.

• Mr Brown’s economic initiatives.

• The PRT’s economic and governance work. The Cabinet Office and MND(SE)

wanted a youth employment programme.

965.  Ms Hendrie and Mr Donal Brown commented that it was “important that the Head

of the PRT has sufficient time allocated [to leading the PRT] alongside her expanding

political work as Deputy CG [Consul General]”.

966.  Gen Dannatt visited Basra at the end of June, reporting a “very positive mood

within MND(SE) and a real sense that we may actually be able to deliver success,

although within a realistic timeframe”.567 He remained “unconvinced that the PRT

in Basra is demonstrating enough energy, purpose and drive to be able to deliver

meaningful results in the timeframe we require”.

967.  Mr McDonald told the 3 July meeting of the ISG that Mr Brown’s statement

to Parliament could highlight three key objectives for the next six months: training

14 Division; successful provincial elections; and handing over Basra Airport to civilian

564  CIG Assessment, 9 June 2008, ‘Iraq: Basra’s economy’.

565  Minute Hall to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 30 May 2008, ‘Iraq: Ministerial Trilateral discussion,

2 June 2008’.

566  Minute Hendrie and Brown to Anderson, 27 June 2008, ‘Iraq BTOR – 13th – 22nd June 2008’.

567  Minute CGS to various, 4 July 2008, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq and Cyprus – 30 Jun-2 Jul 08’.

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