9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
182.
At the start
of September, Mr Prentice sent the FCO a “snapshot of what has
gone
well and
badly over the summer break” and an assessment of prospects for the
autumn
and into
2009 as “background to work starting in Whitehall on a ‘whole Iraq’
strategy
and UK
transition in 2009”.67
Mr Prentice
summarised the content of his advice as
“arguments
for sustaining our investment in the ‘New Iraq’”, but wrote that
the prospects
were “more
clouded” than when he arrived in Iraq the year before.
183.
Under the
heading “What went well”, Mr Prentice recorded that the
security
situation
across Iraq had continued to improve throughout the summer.
Casualty
statistics
were at a four-year low and, despite occasional major incidents,
the trends
remained
downward. The declaration of transition to PIC in Anbar on 1
September had
been a
“highly symbolic success”, as was Tawafuq’s return to
government.
184.
“What went
badly” included the stalling of Iraqi Army operations in Mosul
because
of a lack
of manpower. There had been a deterioration in relations between
Governor
Wa’ili and
the local Iraqi Army command in Basra. Clashes had narrowly been
averted
between the
ISF and the Peshmerga in Diyala, exacerbating Arab-Kurd
tensions.
The US/Iraq
SOFA negotiations had become deadlocked and were suspended
until
mid‑September.
Reconstruction activity “showed little result” and service
provision
across the
country remained problematic.
185.
In
Mr Prentice’s view, Iraq had not yet settled a national
vision: although the
Council of
Representatives had begun to enact some of the laws needed to frame
the
national
political and constitutional settlement, they had postponed the
most difficult
issues.
186.
The Council of
Representatives would now need to tackle a series of
tough
legislative
challenges including the passage of a SOFA, the Elections Law,
the
Hydrocarbons
Law and the 2009 Budget, in addition to the ongoing review of
the
Constitution,
all of which provided “ample scope for … political
deadlock”.
187.
Mr Prentice
concluded:
“It is
against this background that work in Whitehall and here (Baghdad,
Basra and
Erbil) will
shortly be coming together on:
•
Our opening
position for bilateral negotiations with the GoI [Government
of
Iraq] on a
legal base for our forces to stay in Iraq beyond 2008 to
complete
their
present tasks. I have advised already that this should be the
least
challenging
and demanding bid we can make.
67
eGram
34129/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 1 September 2008, ‘Iraq: Prospects
for the Autumn’.
411