The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses analysis and findings in relation to the evidence set out
in
Sections
10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 on:
•
humanitarian
assistance;
•
the
development and implementation of UK reconstruction policy,
strategy and
plans;
•
the UK’s
engagement with the US and successive Iraqi Governments
on
reconstruction;
•
the UK’s
policy on Iraq’s oil and oil revenues;
•
the
Government’s support for UK businesses in securing
reconstruction
contracts;
•
debt
relief; and
•
the reform
of the UK’s approach to post‑conflict reconstruction and
stabilisation.
2.
This Section
does not address:
•
planning
and preparing to provide humanitarian assistance and
reconstruction,
which is
addressed in Sections 6.4 and 6.5;
•
the
financial and human resources available for post‑conflict
reconstruction,
addressed
in Sections 13 and 15 respectively;
•
de‑Ba’athification
and Security Sector Reform, addressed in Sections 11
and 12 respectively;
and
•
the
development of UK strategy and deployment plans, addressed in
Section 9.
3.
During the
period covered by the Inquiry, the Government used a number of
different
terms to
describe post‑conflict activity in Iraq, including
“reconstruction”. It did not
generally
define those terms. The Inquiry uses the term “reconstruction” in
line with the
Government’s
common usage:
•
to include
work to repair and build infrastructure, deliver essential services
and
create
jobs;
•
to include
work to build the capacity of Iraqi institutions and reform
Iraq’s
economic,
legislative and governance structures; and
•
to exclude
Security Sector Reform.
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