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6.1  |  Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq
“… needed to be inside the process, both to influence it, but equally to understand
what was happening, so that if, later on, there was such a request, we knew the
nature of that request and why it had been made.”62
122.  On 25 March, Mr Straw wrote to Mr Blair setting out the risks which could arise
from discussions with President Bush, but suggesting the “case against Iraq and in
favour (if necessary) of military action” might be made in the context of seeking regime
change as an essential part of a strategy of eliminating Iraq’s WMD, rather than an
objective in its own right.63
123.  Mr Straw’s minute, which is addressed in Section 3.2, does not appear to have
been sent to anyone outside No.10.
Mr Blair’s meeting at Chequers, 2 April 2002
124.  Mr Blair discussed the need for a strategy to remove Saddam Hussein and
possible US military action in a meeting at Chequers on 2 April.
125.  The meeting was clearly intended to inform Mr Blair’s approach in his
discussion with President Bush.
126.  Mr Blair’s meeting at Chequers on 2 April is addressed in Section 3.2. No formal
record was made of the discussion, or who was present.
127.  Accounts given by participants suggest that Adm Boyce, Sir Kevin Tebbit
(representing Mr Hoon who was unable to attend), Lt Gen Pigott, Lieutenant General
Cedric Delves (senior UK liaison officer at CENTCOM), Sir Richard Dearlove,
Mr Jonathan Powell (Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff), Sir David Manning and Mr Scarlett
were present.
128.  In relation to the military advice provided at the meeting, Lt Gen Pigott produced a
set of briefing slides at the meeting.64 They identified a provisional end state for military
action against Iraq which was defined as:
“A law‑abiding Iraq which is reintegrated in the international community, that does
not threaten its neighbours, or global security.”
129.  The slides prepared for Lt Gen Pigott also contained elements related to
Afghanistan, the need to eliminate international terrorism as a force in international
affairs and a series of questions in relation to the goals and approach of any military
action in Iraq, including that, if the US wanted the UK to be involved in any military
action, the UK would need to be involved in the planning.
62 Public hearing, 19 January 2010, page 16.
63 Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 25 March 2002, ‘Crawford/Iraq’.
64 Email DCDS(C)/MA2 to CDS REGISTRY-5 and PS/PUS [MOD], 28 March 2002, ‘Iraq Briefing Slides’.
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