9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
242.
Mr Straw and
Secretary Powell spoke by telephone on 24 April.132
The
latter
explained
that US thinking was to combine two draft resolutions – “one on
principles
and the
other on lifting sanctions” – into one: “The market appeared able
to bear that.”
A combined
resolution might be tabled the following week, but more work was
needed
in advance
to align the US, UK and Spanish positions.
243.
Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Cannon on 25 April that:
“… we have
seen a new draft US omnibus resolution on post-conflict Iraq that
takes
no account
of our recent bilateral discussions and would be unnegotiable in
the
244.
The draft
included endorsement for the Coalition’s presence in Iraq,
the
appointment
of a UN Special Co-ordinator, lifting of sanctions and establishing
the IIA.
The FCO
observed that “many of its details will be highly controversial”
and suggested
that Mr
Cannon raise the UK’s issues with the text with Dr
Rice.
245.
Mr Straw had
spoken to Secretary Powell earlier that day.134
He told
Secretary
Powell that
“Greenstock’s view was that the latest US draft SCR [Security
Council
resolution]
would run into the buffers”, and added that he shared that view. Mr
Straw
continued:
“We needed this resolution in a way that we had not needed the
second
resolution.”
That was why the UK had proposed tackling the issues one by one.
He
promised to
send Secretary Powell, who had not been persuaded that the
prospects for
the
resolution were poor, a note detailing UK concerns with the omnibus
US draft.
246.
Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary reported to Sir David Manning on 25 April
that
Mr Straw
had raised concerns with Secretary Powell about rumours that the US
was
planning to
appoint a group of Iraqi exiles as the IIA.135
Secretary
Powell said he would
look into
it.
247.
The Private
Secretary also reported that “we hear from ORHA that Garner
has
invited …
five prominent ‘free Iraqi’ politicians to form the core of the
interim Iraqi
authority”.
The UK remained of the view that this would provoke an adverse
reaction.
248.
On 25 April,
Mr Ricketts reported to Sir Paul Lever, British Ambassador
to
Germany, on
a dinner attended by Mr Straw, Mr Joschka Fischer, the German
Foreign
Minister,
Mr Dominique de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister and Mr Javier
Solana,
EU High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security
Policy.136
132
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 24 April 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with US Secretary
of State,
24 April’.
133
Letter Owen
to Cannon, 25 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Post-Conflict’.
134
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 25 April 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with Colin Powell,
25
April’.
135
Letter Owen
to Cannon, 25 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Post-Conflict’.
136
Letter
Ricketts to Lever, 25 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Discussions with Villepin, Fischer
and Solana’.
171