6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
447.
Mr Blair’s
questions about post-conflict issues, including how to prevent the
Shia
“rising up
to take over from the Sunnis”, are addressed in Section
6.5.
448.
In its
response on 24 February, the MOD advised that the US plan was
to
achieve
“overwhelming effect very early in the campaign” and to dislocate
the regime
(by
decapitating command and control and disrupting communications),
supported
by the
deployment of ground forces into Iraq and their move “towards
Baghdad”.159
The MOD
stated that, apart from the practical consequences of those
elements of the
plan, they
should “remove any doubt in Iraqi minds about the Coalition’s
determination
to remove
the regime”. It was “therefore possible that the regime will
collapse … in the
first few
days. Nonetheless it is impossible to predict … and US planning
assumes up to
125 days of
decisive ground operations”.
449.
The SRG would
be “the final line of defence in inner Baghdad … [and] may
have
tactical
control of CBW within the city”. Security elements close to the
regime might
“fight
until their position becomes untenable”. Lack of training and the
attitude of the
population
might “mitigate the SRG’s ability to mount a protracted guerrilla
campaign”.
There were
fewer SRG personnel in Baghdad than the Adelphi Paper estimated;
and
“their
capability to mount any form of organised resistance … is
minimal”.
450.
Iraq retained
“the capability (through a variety of means) pre-emptively to
deliver
CBW against
Coalition Forces in Kuwait. The question is one of intent.” There
was
“no
intelligence” to indicate that the regime was “currently planning a
pre-emptive strike”.
In the MOD
view, that was “highly unlikely whilst Saddam believes war can be
averted”.
If he was
convinced that war was “inevitable and imminent”, that “might make
a
pre-emptive
move more attractive” but it was “more likely that Saddam would
deploy
CBW after
the onset of the campaign”. The planned levels of Nuclear
Biological
Chemical
(NBC) defence equipment “should enable all troops to withstand
initial BW or
CW attack”
(see Section 6.3).
451.
On the
potential number of casualties, the MOD stated:
“This
question is easier to ask than to answer. Casualty estimation is an
imprecise
and
contextual process, requiring a significant number of assumptions
to be made
for it to
take place at all. Whilst the range of outcomes of a specific
engagement
in which
both sides choose to fight may be predicted with reasonable
confidence,
forecasting
which engagements will take place, in what sequence and under
what
conditions
is much less certain.”
452.
The MOD
explained that it was harder still to take account of
low-probability,
high-impact
events, such as a successful chemical or biological attack. In the
worst
foreseeable
case, a surprise chemical attack could result in up to 100
individuals being
killed and
over 200 needing medical treatment.
159
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Political and Military
Questions’.
455