6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
315.
The paper
warned that there could be substantial pressure on the UK to make
a
“disproportionate”
contribution, and suggested that an “emerging policy position”
would
be
to:
•
maximise
Iraqi contributions;
•
push for
debt rescheduling;
•
maximise
contributions from the multilateral development banks, and secure
IMF
and World
Bank engagement;
•
push for
bilateral contributions to the reconstruction effort to take into
account
military
contributions (with countries that would make no military
contribution
paying a
higher share of reconstruction costs); and
•
ensure a
finance ministry/IFI lead on financing issues, with no money
committed
until a
proper needs assessment had been done.
316.
The Treasury
informed the Inquiry that Mr Brown did not comment on the
paper.157
317.
Treasury
officials sent Mr Brown further updates on the likely total
cost of war,
including
humanitarian and reconstruction costs, later in
February.
318.
The Treasury’s
response to departments’ requests for additional funding to
cover
the
anticipated costs of post-conflict Iraq is covered in detail in
Section 13.1.
319.
The FCO
sent guidance on post-conflict issues to overseas posts
on
7 February.
The guidance stated that:
•
The UK was
planning on a contingency basis for what the
international
community
should do if Saddam Hussein were removed.
•
The UK
wanted to hand back power to the Iraqi people as quickly
as
possible,
but with Iraq “radically reformed for the better”.
•
Timing of
the three stage transition was uncertain.
•
Iraq’s
public administration could be expected to work “adequately”
once
senior
regime officials had been removed.
•
The role of
the UN was still a matter of active debate.
320.
On 7 February,
the FCO sent guidance on “day after” issues to all
overseas
posts.158
The
guidance stated that the UK’s goal was disarmament of Iraq’s WMD,
not
regime
change, but that, since military action could not be ruled out, it
was “sensible to
plan on a
contingency basis, for what the international community should do
in Iraq” if
Saddam
Hussein’s regime were removed from power.
157
Email
Treasury to Iraq Inquiry, 26 February 2010,
[untitled].
158
Telegram 67
FCO to Abidjan, 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq: “Day After”
Questions’.
365