The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
UK needed
better access to policy in the CPA (US officials in Washington were
“equally
blind”).
Mr Blair’s exchange with President Bush might
help.
349.
ISOG agreed
that the DTI should proceed on the basis of principles
proposed
by Ms
MacNaughton. It also agreed that the UK should lobby again for
Mr Fletcher’s
secondment
to the CPA Oil Team (which the CPA had blocked so
far).
350.
The Cabinet
Office issued the final version of the UK Iraq Strategy (the UK’s
first
cross-Whitehall
strategy for Iraq) to members of the AHMGIR on 8
October.190
351.
The Strategy
was set at a high level, was only broadly consistent with the
CPA’s
strategy,
and was extremely ambitious. Section 9.2 describes the development
of the
Strategy,
and Section 10.1 the elements relating to
reconstruction.
352.
The Strategy
stated that the US had far greater resources than the UK, that
UK
influence
over US policy was limited and the UK’s approach would be
“vulnerable to
shifts in
US thinking”.
353.
The Strategy
stated that “to help planning”, Iraq’s recovery should be
considered
in three
phases: stabilisation, to December 2003; recovery, to December
2004; and
normalisation,
from January 2005. The Strategy defined “UK objectives” for each
phase
in relation
to security, the political process, and
reconstruction.
354.
The Strategy
included UK objectives for oil production:
•
In the
stabilisation phase (to December 2003), Iraq would reach
pre-conflict
levels of
“development and order”. Oil production would reach 80 percent
of
pre‑conflict
levels (2m bpd against 2.5m bpd in the pre-conflict
period).
•
In the
recovery phase, to December 2004, Iraq would exceed pre-conflict
levels
of
development and order. Oil production would reach 3m bpd, and oil
and other
natural
resources would be “managed sustainably for the
long-term”.
•
In the
normalisation phase, from January 2005, Iraq would be
largely
self‑supporting.
The Iraqi authorities would be in full control of oil
production,
and operating
in a transparent manner.
355.
The Strategy
did not specify how those oil production targets had been defined,
or
the UK’s
role in achieving them.
356.
The Strategy
stated that the UK would continue to be active in a number of
areas
but would,
as Ministers had directed, focus its engagement on economic
management,
security
sector reform and oil.
357.
The main
source of funding for reconstruction would be the DFI. It had
provided
US$1.2bn
towards the 2003 Iraqi budget and was forecast to provide US$13bn
in 2004.
190
Minute Dodd
to Sheinwald, 8 October 2003, ‘UK Iraq Strategy’.
426