10.2 | Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009

908. He advised that DFID had increased the number of full-time equivalent staff

working on the economic initiatives from four in January 2008 to 10. DFID would also

establish a Basra Support Office in Baghdad. DFID was recruiting internally to staff that

office, and was discussing with other departments including the FCO, the MOD and UK

Trade and Investment what role they could play. Mr Wareing had stated that this level of

staffing was “fully adequate” to deliver the initiatives.

909. In his evidence to the Inquiry, Mr Wareing highlighted three major successes within

the Basra economic initiatives:

• the youth unemployment programme, which Prime Minister Maliki had

expressed interest in rolling out nationwide;

• Basra International Airport and Umm Qasr port, where Mr Wareing had been

able to bring together the UK military, DFID and local Iraqi leaders; and

• the establishment of the National Investment Commission and the Basra

Investment Commission.533

910. Mr Keith MacKiggan, Head of the PRT from September 2008, told the Inquiry that

the economic initiatives had been “very effective”, as evidenced by:

• the interest shown by the Iraqi Government in replicating the initiatives

country‑wide;

• the amount of investment that they attracted into Basra; and

• the economic confidence that they had helped to engender.534

911. On 25 March 2008, in response to growing concerns over the security situation in

Basra, Prime Minister Maliki launched a major offensive against Basra militias.535

912. Section 9.6 considers the genesis and implementation of that military operation,

which came to be known as the Charge of the Knights, and the damage to UK-Iraqi and

UK-US relations.

913. Mr Browne reported to Cabinet on recent events in Basra on 1 April.536 He said

that the decision to launch the operation had come as a surprise to everyone. Mr Brown

said that Ministers would have a further discussion of the implications of recent events at

NSID(OD).

914. NSID(OD) met later that day, with Mr Brown in the chair, to consider the UK’s

“continuing role in Basra in 2008/2009, and the timelines and considerations for taking

533 Public hearing, 16 July 2010, page 55.

534 Public hearing, 7 January 2010, pages 22-23.

535 BBC News, 25 March 2008, Basra’s gun rule risks Iraq future.

536 Cabinet Conclusions, 1 April 2008.

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