9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
government
spokesmen and officials began to ameliorate comment and
produce
70.
Public
statements by the US Embassy and the MNF-I stressed “that any
agreement
would be
transparent, that there was no desire to have permanent US bases
and that
there is no
intent to use Iraq as a base from which to conduct offensive
operations
against
third parties”.
71.
In the same
note, Lt Gen Cooper reflected on the remaining tasks for the UK in
the
South of
Iraq:
“… it is
worth considering what is achievable between now and the end of
2008 and
the first
half of 2009. I have already commented on the need to have metrics
that are
measurable
and understandable to non-military audiences in relation to
completing
the
training of 14 IA Div … And if we can get 14 Div right, I am
confident that we will
have set
the conditions for the successful delivery of Provincial elections
in Basra.”
72.
Lt Gen Cooper
reported that Gen Petraeus had concluded on the basis of
UK
statements
that there would remain a UK brigade in place in 2009, probably
focused
on Basra
alone. Lt Gen Cooper cautioned that there had not yet been a
political decision
on future
deployments. He told ACM Stirrup that:
“It is
difficult in Baghdad to discuss the issue substantively in the
absence of a
confirmed
political decision. Given the impending PM-POTUS meeting, I
would
expect
Petraeus’ expectation to be briefed to President
Bush.”
73.
On 9 June, a
Current Intelligence Group (CIG) considered Basra city’s economy,
the
impact of
criminal activity, obstacles to reconstruction and the likely
impact of provincial
elections
and Iranian influence.23
The CIG’s
Key Judgements included:
“I. The
recent Iraqi Government security operation in Basra City had
largely driven
the Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM) from the streets and brought a degree of stability.
While
this lasts,
there is a window of opportunity to create the conditions for
economic
growth.
However, insecurity, institutional incapacity, corruption,
legislation,
competing
political agendas, crime and smuggling will remain impediments
to
reconstruction
and development for the next twelve months.
…
“V. Militia
violence and intimidation, which specifically targeted middle
class
Basrawis,
prompted many to leave, leaving a shortage of capable
local
entrepreneurs,
which is likely to persist beyond 2008.”
22
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 9 June 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (304) 9 Jun
08’.
23
CIG
Assessment, 9 June 2008, ‘Iraq: Basra’s Economy’.
393