6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
243.
Mr Bowen
suggested “Iraq Operational Policy Unit” as a name for the new
body.
He asked
Mr Ehrman, Ms Miller, Mr Pollard and Brig Rollo to take
action to set up the
unit and
reported that Sir David Manning supported the thrust of the
proposed approach.
244.
The Chiefs of
Staff meeting on 5 February was informed that: “Output from
the
FCO unit
would feed US planning through the newly appointed Major General
Tim
Cross, the
senior UK secondee to ORHA, working for Lt Gen
Garner.”116
The unit
would
be informed
by the PJHQ seminar on post-conflict issues.
245.
Mr Ricketts
explained to Mr Straw that the new unit would be headed
by
Mr Chilcott,
located in the FCO’s Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Directorate and
include
participants from the MOD and DFID. It would be closely linked to
the Cabinet
Office
co-ordinating machinery.117
246.
The IPU,
headed by Mr Chilcott, was established on 10
February.118
247.
On 11
February, Mr O’Brien chaired an internal FCO briefing on
post-conflict
issues, at
which he commissioned work from the IPU and “stressed the need to
consider
how our
work fitted into a managed exit strategy”.119
Mr O’Brien
suggested that other
Arab
states’ contribution to the modernisation of Iraq “would assist in
[the] process of
exiting and
handover”.
248.
The record of
the FCO Iraq Evening Meeting on 27 February stated that
Mr Straw
had asked
Mr O’Brien to focus on post-conflict issues.120
249.
The Inquiry
has seen no other evidence of that decision or explanation of the
role
Mr O’Brien
was expected to play.
250.
Mr O’Brien
was actively engaged on post-conflict issues after the creation of
the
IPU,
including a visit to New York and Washington to discuss Phase IV
with the US and
251.
On 17
February, Sir Michael Jay sent draft terms of reference for the IPU
to
Sir Andrew
Turnbull, the Cabinet Secretary, copied to Whitehall Permanent
Secretaries.
The draft,
which had already been discussed with DFID, the MOD and the
Cabinet
Office,
stated:
“The unit
will operate within broad policy guidelines set by the Cabinet
Office.
In the FCO,
it will report to the Director Middle East and North Africa
Command
[Mr Chaplin].
Its main customers will be British military planners in PJHQ, MOD
and,
116
Minutes, 5
February 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
117
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq
Strategy’.
118
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day-After (Phase IV)’.
119
Minute
APS/Mr O’Brien to Chilcott, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After
Issues’.
120
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 27 February 2003, ‘Iraq Evening Meeting:
Key Points’.
121
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV
(Day After)’.
353