9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
a change
in the basic goal and direction, but “we would have to be realistic
about what
we could
hope to achieve in the short and medium term”. Success
would:
“… depend
to a great extent on the Iraqi Government providing us with
conditions
that
allowed us to operate, including through effective action by Maliki
to deal with
elements of
JAM and Badr”.
233.
At a meeting
of DOP on 26 October, the medium term prospects paper
was
discussed
again alongside an update from Mr Browne on security
developments
234.
ACM Stirrup
advised that, militarily, the security operations in Basra “could
not
be going
better, although there had been an increase in the number of
indirect fire
attacks on
the Basra Palace compound”. The main concern of Basrawis was
whether
the success
of the operation could be sustained, which “would require
engagement and
funds from
the Government in Baghdad”.
235.
Mr Blair
commented on the support from Iran for Shia militias, which had
serious
implications
for the MNF and the region. There was a risk that UK troop
withdrawals
would
convince the Iranians that their strategy was working.
236.
DOP agreed the
analysis and recommendations contained in the medium
term
prospects
paper, subject to further work already commissioned, and agreed the
UK’s
planning
assumption should be for a reduction of UK force levels to around
4,500 in
2007.
Officials should be asked to develop a “strategy for handling
Iran”.
237.
Mr Blair
also mentioned the work of the Iraq Study Group and told
DOP:
“We needed
to develop ideas of our own to help shape the US
approach.”
238.
At a meeting
of the Iraq Strategy Group on 27 October, Mr Sawers reported
that
discussion
of Iran’s involvement in Iraq “had concluded that the problem could
not be
solved in
Iraq … a wider strategy for handling Iran, co-ordinating the
response to Iran’s
regional
influence, was required”.140
239.
At the same
meeting of the Iraq Strategy Group Mr Simon McDonald, FCO
Director
Iraq,
reported that the security situation in Basra had deteriorated to
the point where
Mrs Beckett
had decided that it would be necessary to withdraw the majority of
civilian
staff from
Basra Palace. Mr Benn agreed with that view.
240.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald confirmed that Mr Blair would be content to
accept
Mrs Beckett’s
judgement on the matter. Ms Margaret Aldred, Deputy Head of
the
Overseas
and Defence Secretariat, suggested that further work would be
needed to
139
Minutes, 26
October 2006, DOP meeting.
140
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 30 October 2006,
‘Iraq Strategy Group, 27 October’.
47