The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
202.
The FCO
identified three options which, it believed, met the legal
requirements
and
reflected Lord Goldsmith’s advice, that “the key element of any
resolution would
be a
sufficient link back [to] resolution 1441, to establish that the
[Security] Council has
concluded
that Iraq has failed to take its ‘final opportunity’”.
203.
All three
options included a first operative paragraph (OP) stating that the
Security
Council
decided that:
“Iraq has
failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in resolution
1441 (2002) by
submitting
a declaration pursuant to that resolution containing [false
statements and]
omissions
and by failing to comply with and co-operate fully in the
implementation
of, that
resolution”.
204.
The options
also included a final OP determining that the Council had
decided
“to remain
seized of the matter”.
205.
The difference
between the three options was whether to include an
additional
OP containing
an “ultimatum”, “couched in general terms”.
206.
To avoid the
risk of opening up the debate about whether a further
determination
that Iraq
had failed to comply with the ultimatum was needed from the
Security Council,
the FCO
proposed “a formula which would, in effect, authorise action
against Iraq unless
the Council
took the decision that Iraq had decided to come into
compliance”.
207.
The FCO draft
proposed: “unless … the Council concludes before 5 March that
the
Government
of Iraq has taken an unconditional and irreversible decision [at
the highest
levels] to
come into compliance with its obligations under resolution 1441
(2002) and
previous
relevant resolutions” either:
•
“the final
opportunity granted to Iraq in resolution 1441 (2002) will expire
on
5 March
2003”; or
•
“Iraq will
face the serious consequences it has been repeatedly warned
of,
including
in paragraph 13 of resolution 1441 (2202)”.
208.
The draft
provided for the decision to be “based on” reports from
Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei.
209.
The FCO
explained that it was:
“… possible
to imagine more explicit options, particularly those which include
an
explicit
finding that Iraq is in ‘material breach’. This would not be
strictly necessary
from a
legal point of view. But, as a matter of tactics, we will need to
consider with
the
Americans whether we should start with a more ambitious text
…”
218