The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
through key
Ministers in small groups. The position at present was that
the
Prime Minister
had decided over the weekend on the following:
“a. no
Ministerial meetings at this stage;
b. a
preference, when they became necessary, for the ‘late Afghan’
model
to
apply - ie PM; Defence Secretary; Foreign Secretary; CDS; C;
Scarlett;
Attorney
General and Alastair Campbell as appropriate;
c.
meanwhile for Restricted COBR meetings to begin on a twice weekly
basis
under
Manning’s chairmanship;
d. for a
wider DOP Committee of officials to begin work, under
Bowen’s
chairmanship,
which would be the vehicle for bringing in OGDs [other
government
departments] – DFID, Customs etc.”223
394.
Sir Kevin
commented:
“This seems
satisfactory for the time being, although we shall need to watch
to
ensure that
(b) does not begin without you being present and that (c) provides
the
framework
we need to link effectively with the contingency planning in the
MOD
(and
perhaps to begin to consider tricky issues of wider relevance, eg
the effect on
energy
prices and oil aftermath management). I should have preferred Bowen
to run
a
restricted officials forum, given the other pressures on Manning’s
time, the need
to begin
setting a regular rhythm, and some of the wider issues to be
confronted.
But I
do not think we can do better for the present.”
395.
The clearest
statement of the composition and remit of the AHGI seen by
the
Inquiry is
in a letter from Mr Drummond to government departments on 18
September,
in which
he stated:
“Desmond
Bowen here will be chairing a new committee, known as the Ad
Hoc
Group on
Iraq (AHGI), which will pull together wider issues (both overseas
and
domestic),
and some elements of contingency planning. The Group will have
to
consider
both the inspection route, and the implications if that route
failed and
military
action follows. I will be Desmond’s alternate with Tom Dodd as
secretary.
The Group
will comprise representatives of the FCO, MOD, Treasury, Home
Office,
DfT
[Department for Transport], Intelligence Agencies, Cabinet Office,
DTI, DFID
and ACPO
[Association of Chief Police Officers]. Other departments will be
invited
as and when
they have an interest in the agenda. We will be looking to have a
fairly
settled
membership at Head of Department level or above as much of the work
will
need to be
conducted in a discreet manner. At this stage we envisage AHGI
meeting
on a weekly
basis, with the first meeting later this week. Detailed pol/mil
[politico-
military]
co-ordination will be handled separately.
223
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq:
Machinery of Government’.
178