The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
226.
Mr Blair
also wrote:
“Chile and
Mexico were prepared to go along, but only up to a point. Ricardo
made
it clear
that if there was heavy opposition from France, it would be tough
for them to
participate
in what would then be a token vote, incapable of being passed
because
of a veto –
and what’s more, a veto not by Russia, but by France.
“Unfortunately,
the French position had, if anything, got harder not softer.
They
were
starting to say they would not support military action in any
circumstances,
irrespective
of what the inspectors found …”
227.
In a press
conference on 10 March, Mr Annan reiterated the Security
Council’s
determination
to disarm Iraq, but said that every avenue for a peaceful
resolution of
the crisis
had to be exhausted before force should be used.109
228.
Mr Annan
also warned that, if the Security Council failed to agree on a
common
position
and action was taken without the authority of the Council, the
legitimacy and
support for
any such action would be seriously impaired.
229.
In an
interview on 10 March, President Chirac stated that it was for
the inspectors
to advise
whether they could complete their task.110
If they
reported that they were not
in a
position to guarantee Iraq’s disarmament, it would be:
“… for the
Security Council alone to decide the right thing to do. But in that
case …
regrettably,
the war would become inevitable. It isn’t today.”
230.
President
Chirac stated that he did not consider that the draft resolution
tabled by
the US, UK
and Spain would attract support from nine members of the Security
Council.
In that
case, there would be no majority for action, “So there won’t be a
veto problem.”
231.
But if there
were a majority “in favour of the new resolution”, France
would
“vote
‘no’”.
232.
In response to
a question asking, “And, this evening, this is your position
in
principle?”,
President Chirac responded:
“My
position is that, regardless of the circumstances, France will vote
‘no’ because
she
considers this evening that there are no grounds for waging war in
order to
achieve the
goal we have set ourselves, that is to disarm Iraq.”
233.
By
11 March, it was clear that, in the time available before the
US was
going to
take military action, it would be difficult to secure nine votes in
the
109
United
Nations, 10 March 2003, Secretary-General’s
press conference (unofficial transcript).
110
The
Élysée,
Interview
télévisée de Jacques Chirac, le 10 mars 2003. A
translation for HMG was
produced in
a Note, [unattributed and undated], ‘Iraq – Interview given by M.
Jacques Chirac,
President
of the Republic, to French TV (10 March 2003)’.
600