9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
159.
Mr Asquith
raised the threatened withdrawal of the (Sunni) Tawafuq Party from
the
Iraqi
Government, to which he reported that Prime Minister Maliki seemed
“resigned”.
Mr Asquith
advised him that:
“… the best
chance of keeping all the communities in government would be to
work
on specific
issues … where agreement could be reached. The idea of signing up
to
broad
principles seemed rather past its time; the parties had done all
that on many
occasions
in the past.”
160.
Between the
end of the meeting and Mr Asquith’s report of the outcome to
London,
five
Tawafuq Ministers and Deputy Prime Minister Zawba’i formally
announced their
withdrawal
from the government.
161.
On 2 August,
Mr Asquith reported a “political crisis” in Iraq and that
“real progress
[is] only
possible if Maliki addresses Sunni security concerns – and that
means ceding
some
authority in an area he views as his sole
preserve”.71
162.
Following the
resignations by Tawafuq Ministers a “leadership summit”
was
planned,
covering “legislation, government business (including shared
decision making,
reform of
the security institutions, militias, detainees and human rights),
national
reconciliation
(including some form of amnesty …) and establishing a political
front”.
163.
Mr Asquith
again advised senior Iraqi politicians that “the time for
statements of
principles
had now passed” and that action was needed, focused on key Sunni
concerns
(human
rights abuses, detainees and the protection of Sunni areas in
Baghdad).
He concluded:
“The
prospect is a period of floundering and activity – largely for its
own sake – in
the hope
that a way will be found to bring Tawafuq back into … government …
It
might just
work if the effort is directed at taking action on Sunni concerns.
But those
are all
essentially in the security field …”
164.
Priorities and
timescales following Mr Brown’s visit to the US were
discussed
at the Iraq
Strategy Group on 2 August.72
Mr McDonald
reported that Mr Brown had
told
President Bush that the UK was planning to leave Basra Palace by 31
August
if
Gen Petraeus was content. The key issue would be Iraqi
capability to continue to
protect the
site.
165.
Mr McDonald
told attendees that Mr Brown had stressed the successful
transfer
from combat
to overwatch in three provinces in his public comments, but had
made clear
that there
would be no announcement of any further changes to the UK’s posture
or
presence in
Iraq before Parliament returned from its summer recess on 7
October.
71
eGram
32865/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 2 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Political
Crisis: Where We Are’.
72
Minute
Blake to McDonald, 2 August 2007, ‘Iraq Strategy Group, 2
August’.
213