3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
“There is
one common, consistent theme … the total determination of
Saddam
to maintain
that programme; to risk war, international ostracism, sanctions
and
the isolation
of the Iraqi economy …”
176.
Addressing the
question of why Saddam Hussein had decided in
mid‑September,
but not
before, to permit the weapons inspectors, Mr Blair stated that
the answer was
in the
dossier, and it was because:
“… his
chemical, biological and nuclear programme is not an historic
left‑over from
1998. The
inspectors are not needed to clean up the old remains. His
weapons
of mass
destruction programme is active, detailed and growing. The policy
of
containment
is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is
not
shut down;
it is up and running now.”
177.
Mr Blair
stated that the dossier disclosing the intelligence assessments
provided
by the JIC
had been produced because it was “important to explain our concerns
about
Saddam to
the British people”. The “intelligence picture” painted by the JIC
“had been
accumulated
over the last four years” and was:
“…
extensive, detailed and authoritative. It concludes that Iraq has
chemical and
biological
weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he
has
existing
and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological
weapons
which could
be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own
Shia
population,
and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons
capability.”
178.
Addressing the
content of the dossier, Mr Blair told Parliament
that:
•
As well as
the chemical agents and pre‑cursor chemicals, growth media
for
anthrax and
special munitions for the delivery of chemical and biological
agents
which were
“missing and unaccounted for” in 1998, Iraq continued “to
produce
chemical
weapons; has rebuilt previously destroyed production plants
across
Iraq; has
brought dual use chemical facilities; has retained key personnel …
and
has a
serious ongoing research programme into weapons production, all of
it
well
funded”.
•
“…
production of biological agents has continued; facilities formerly
used for
biological
agents have been rebuilt; equipment has been purchased for such
a
programme;
and again Saddam Hussein has retained the personnel who
worked
on it prior
to 1991. In particular, the UN inspection regime discovered that
Iraq
was trying
to acquire mobile biological weapons facilities … Present
intelligence
confirms
that it has now got such facilities.” The UK believed Iraq could
produce
anthrax,
botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin, which “all eventually result
in
excruciatingly
painful death”.
•
Saddam
Hussein’s previous nuclear programme had been “shut down
by
the
inspectors” and “known remaining stocks of uranium” were “held
under
229