5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
761.
Mr Blair
told the Liaison Committee on 21 January 2003 that, if the reported
breach
was a
pattern of behaviour rather than conclusive proof would require
“more considered
762.
As the
Inquiry indicates in Sections 3.7 and 3.8, Mr Blair and his
advisers in
No.10 had
been very closely involved, particularly since the beginning of
March,
in
examining the reports of the UN weapons inspectors and had access
to advice
from the
JIC on the activities of the Iraqi regime.
763.
In his 7
March advice Lord Goldsmith had advised that Mr Blair “would
have
to consider
extremely carefully whether the evidence of non-co-operation
and
non-compliance
by Iraq [was] sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion
that
Iraq had
failed to take its final opportunity”.
764.
But
Mr Blair did not seek and did not receive considered advice
from
across
government specifically examining whether the evidence was
“sufficiently
compelling”
to provide the basis for a judgement of this magnitude
and
seriousness.
765.
In
mid-March, UNMOVIC was reporting increased co-operation, and
the
IAEA had
confirmed that Iraq had no nuclear weapons or nuclear
weapons
programmes.
766.
The Inquiry
has not seen any evidence of consideration of whether
the
reports by
UNMOVIC and the IAEA to the Security Council during January
to
March 2003
constituted reports to the Council under OP11 of resolution 1441;
or
whether the
subsequent Security Council discussions constituted
“consideration”
as required
by OP12.
767.
There was
clearly no majority support in the Security Council for
a
conclusion
that the process set in hand by resolution 1441 had reached the
end
of the
road.
768.
Asked if he
had been working from the definition of material breach set out
by
Mr Straw
in November 2002, Mr Blair told the Inquiry:
769.
Asked about
the process that he had followed before giving the
determination
requested
by Lord Goldsmith, Mr Blair told the Inquiry:
“We went
back over the Blix reports and it was very obvious to me,
particularly on
the subject
of interviews, that they weren’t co-operating. They were
co-operating
more, as
you rightly say. They started to give out a little bit more, but
there was
324
Minutes,
Liaison Committee (House of Commons), 21 January 2003 [Minutes of
Evidence], Q&A 24.
325
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 111.
137