The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
466.
Lt Gen
Reith provided specific briefing that:
•
Combat
availability of both Challenger 2 and AS90 tanks was “very high”
and
the
desertisation and protection measures for Challenger 2 were fitted
before
war‑fighting.
The AS90 desertisation measure was not completed until
4 May
“but was
not required for war-fighting, although it would have been if
hostilities
had
continued as had been expected”.
•
The supply
of Combat ID was “over-taut” but 1 (UK) Div reported that “there
was
just enough
for equipment in the direct fire zone”. The late arrival was due
to
distribution
problems but, where it was supplied, it had been
effective.
•
There had
been a shortfall of ComboPens that was addressed by the issue
of
“out-of-date
pens” as a “last resort”. The shortfall was “traceable to
enduring
manufacturing
difficulties, acknowledged in early 02”. Alternative provision
was
being
considered but was proving problematic.
•
The
respirator testing kits had arrived in theatre between
24 February and
7 March
“but were subject to a delay in distribution because of the
large
amounts of
higher priority stores, such as CR2 [Challenger 2] and Combat
ID
UOR
equipment”.
“I draw two
valuable lessons from this work:
“(a) In
future, we should try to be less reliant on UORs for operations;
fitting these in
the time
available and in austere conditions further stretches an already
over-loaded
logistic
organisation. Thus, there is a strong case for better resourcing
and I hope
this point
now will be accepted where it perhaps has not been in the
past.
“(b) ‘Just
enough just in time’ is probably a flawed policy for military
operations.
SDR
directed that the DLO should only hold that which could not be
procured
within
readiness and preparation time. However, the stock levels held
speak
for themselves.”
468.
Lt Gen
Reith added that both points had been “exacerbated by the
understandable
reluctance
of Ministers to go early to industry … before formal committal to
the
operation”.
He also wrote that the military’s commitment was, “as often
happens,
at a scale
beyond that envisaged in the DPAs and thus not fully
resourced”.
469.
Lt Gen
Reith reiterated those points on 16 May when he produced a
“Top 10
Lessons
Identified” document for the DOC.228
228
Minute CJO
to DOC, 16 May 03, ‘Operation TELIC –“Top 10” Lessons
Identified – Pre-Deployment
and Deployment
Phases’.
74