The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• the US to make clear that it “accepted a significant UN role in post-conflict

Iraq”.202

496. Mr Grainger sent a copy of Mr Ricketts’ advice to Mr Straw to Ms Adams, setting

out the ultimatum language under consideration which he thought “would be entirely

consistent with the advice previously given by the Attorney”, including the need for any

ultimatum to be expressed in very clear terms so that there was no room for doubt about

whether Iraq had met the Council’s demands.203

497. In the light of the failure to secure support for the draft resolution of

24 February , Mr Blair proposed a revised strategy to President Bush on 5 March.

498. Despite Lord Goldsmith’s previous advice that, if a further resolution was

vetoed, there would be no Council authorisation for military action, Mr Blair told

President Bush that, if nine votes could be secured, military action in the face of

a veto would be “politically and legally … acceptable”.

499. Mr Blair spoke to President Bush on 5 March proposing further amendment to the

draft resolution to give members of the Security Council a reason to support the US/UK

approaches.204

500. Mr Blair said that an ultimatum should include a deadline of 10 days from the date

of the resolution for the Security Council to decide that: “Unless … Iraq is complying by

[no date specified], then Iraq is in material breach.”

501. Mr Blair stated that if there were nine votes but a French veto, he thought that

“politically and legally” UK participation in military action would be acceptable. “But if

we did not get nine votes, such participation might be legal”, but he would face major

obstacles. It would be “touch and go”.

502. In response to a request from Mr Straw about “whether it was possible for a

Permanent Member of the Security Council to vote against a resolution while making it

clear that this negative vote shall not be regarded as a ‘veto’”, Mr Wood advised that the

“short answer is ‘no’”.205

503. Lord Goldsmith’s draft advice of 14 January stated explicitly that the exercise

of a veto in relation to a further Security Council decision would mean “no Council

authorisation for military action”.206

202 Minute Ricketts to PS [FCO], 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UN Tactics’.

203 Letter Grainger to Adams, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Second Resolution’.

204 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Bush, 5 March’.

205 Minute Wood to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Security Council Voting’.

206 Minute [Goldsmith to Prime Minister], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Interpretation of Resolution 1441’.

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