The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
In that
respect, I don’t think toppling Saddam Hussein is germane to the
long‑term
ambitions
of some terrorist groups to use them.”166
353.
Asked
specifically about the theory that at some point in the future
Saddam
Hussein
would probably have brought together international terrorism and
weapons
of mass
destruction in a threat to Western interests, Baroness
Manningham‑Buller
responded:
“It is a
hypothetical theory. It certainly wasn’t of concern in either the
short‑term
or the
medium‑term to my colleagues and myself.”167
354.
Asked if “a
war in Iraq would aggravate the threat from whatever source
to
the United
Kingdom”, Baroness Manningham‑Buller stated that that was the
view
communicated
by the JIC Assessments.168
355.
Baroness
Manningham‑Buller subsequently added that if Ministers had read
the
JIC
Assessments they could “have had no doubt” about that
risk.169
She said
that by the
time of the
July 2005 attacks in London:
“... an
increasing number of British‑born individuals ... were attracted to
the ideology
of Usama
Bin Laden and saw the West’s activities in Iraq and Afghanistan
as
threatening
their fellow religionists and the Muslim world.”
356.
Asked whether
the judgement that the effect of the invasion of Iraq had
increased
the
terrorist threat to the UK was based on hard evidence or a broader
assessment,
Baroness
Manningham‑Buller replied:
“I think we
can produce evidence because of the numerical evidence of the
number
of plots,
the number of leads, the number of people identified, and the
correlation of
that to
Iraq and statements of people as to why they were involved ... So I
think the
answer to
your ... question: yes.”170
357.
In its request
for a statement, the Inquiry asked Mr Blair if he had read the
JIC
Assessment
of 10 February 2002, and what weight he had given to it when he
decided
to take
military action.171
358.
In his
statement Mr Blair wrote:
“I was
aware of the JIC Assessment of 10 February that the Al Qaida threat
to the
UK would
increase. But I took the view then and take the same view now that
to
have backed
down because of the threat of terrorism would be completely
wrong.
166
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 23‑24.
167
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 24.
168
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 31.
169
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 33.
170
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, pages 33‑34.
171
Inquiry
request for a witness statement, 13 December 2010, Qs 11c and 11d
page 7.
50