4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
“… there
was a flow of intelligence to the inspectors which in some cases …
led to
discoveries
… and in cases where it didn’t, it simply wasn’t possible for us to
reach
a firm view
on whether the deficiency was in the intelligence or in the ability
to move
fast enough
in Iraq to have uncovered what was said to have been
concealed.”299
729.
The problems
were not confined to the UK. The US Senate Select
Committee
on
Intelligence report on the U.S.
Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on
Iraq, published on
9 July 2004, concluded:
“The
intelligence community suffered from a collective presumption that
Iraq had
an active
and growing WMD program. This “group think” led intelligence
community
analysts,
collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence
as
conclusively
indicative of a WMD program and to ignore or minimise evidence
that
Iraq did
not have active and expanding weapons of mass destruction
programs.
This
presumption was so strong that formal mechanisms established to
challenge
assumptions
and group think were not used.”300
730.
In the
context of the lessons from the preparation of the September
2002
dossier,
the Inquiry identified in Section 4.2 the benefits of separating
the
responsibility
for assessment of intelligence from the responsibility for setting
out
the
arguments in support of a policy.
731.
The
evidence in this Section reinforces that lesson. It shows that
the
intelligence
and assessments made by the JIC about Iraq’s capabilities
and
intent
continued to be used to prepare briefing material to support
Government
statements
in a way which conveyed certainty without acknowledging
the
limitations
of the intelligence.
732.
In the context
of its examination of the role of the JIC in the preparation of
the
September
2002 dossier, the Butler Review commented:
“The JIC,
with commendable motives, took responsibility for the dossier in
order
that its
content should properly reflect the judgements of the intelligence
community.
They did
their utmost to ensure that this standard was met. But this will
have put a
strain on
them in seeking to maintain their normal standards of neutral and
objective
assessment.
Intelligence assessment is necessarily based heavily on
judgement,
relying on
such material as intelligence has provided. It is not simply a
matter of
299
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 39.
300
Select
Committee on Intelligence, 9 July 2004, Report of
the Select Committee on Intelligence on the
U.S.
Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence assessments on
Iraq.
419