The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
That’s it.
In any event, he probably would screw it up and not meet the
deadline,
and if
he came forward after the deadline, we could just refuse to
deal.”
426.
“The
Evidence”: Mr Blair
wrote that he had been told that the US thought
evidence
was
unnecessary but his view was “we still need to make the case”. He
suggested:
“If we
recapitulate all the WMD evidence; add his attempts to secure
nuclear
capability;
and, as seems possible, add on the Al Qaida link, it will be
hugely
persuasive
over here. Plus … the abhorrent nature of the regime. It could be
done
simultaneously
with the deadline.”
427.
“MEPP”: Mr
Blair wrote that it would be “essential” for Arab support for
negotiation
to have
started “in earnest”. It was “worth a real effort to get a proper
negotiation going”,
and that
wouldn’t start unless someone took charge of the
detail.
428.
Addressing
Iraq “Post
Saddam”, Mr Blair
wrote:
“Suppose we
were able to say … Regime change is vital and, in the first
instance, it
must be one
that protects Iraq’s territorial integrity and provides stability;
and hence
might
involve another key military figure. But it should lead in time to
a democratic
Iraq
governed by the people. This would be very powerful. I need advice
on whether
it’s
feasible. But just swapping one dictator for another seems
inconsistent with
our values.”
429.
Mr Blair
suggested that some in the “Arab/Moslem
World” would “fall
into line”,
but others
would not; and Syria and Iran “might be actively hostile or use it
as a means
to support
terrorism in Israel”. A “dedicated effort” was needed “to woo the
Arab world”,
and “to
offer hardliners a very hard-headed partnership or put them on the
‘axis of evil’
list”.
430.
Mr Blair wrote
that “Afghanistan” had to
be “going right, not wrong”. It was “our
one act of
regime change so far, so it had better be a good advertisement”,
and his
“hunch” was
that it needed “renewed focus and effort”.
431.
Mr Blair wrote
that both Turkey and the Kurds would “need to be OK”. They
might
be the
“easiest” [members of a coalition]: “They both want our help badly
and will play
ball if
offered enough.”
432.
Mr Blair told
President Bush that he would be “happy to try to pull this [the
strategy]
together;
ie to dedicate myself to getting all these [six] elements … sorted,
including
involving
myself in the MEPP”. But it would need “a huge commitment in time
and
energy”,
and was “only really worth doing if we are all on the same
page”.
433.
In a final
section on “The Military
Plan”, Mr Blair
wrote:
“Finally,
obviously, we must have a workable military plan. I don’t know the
details
yet, so
this is first blush.
74