7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
A crazy act
of aggression? No, we would not have supported that. But
given
the history,
you couldn’t call Saddam a crazy target.
“Personally
I have little doubt that at some point we would have to have
dealt
268.
At “about
3.15pm UK time” on 17 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock announced
that
the
resolution would not be put to a vote, stating that the co-sponsors
reserved the right
to take
their own steps to secure the disarmament of Iraq.132
269.
The subsequent
discussion in the Council suggested that only the UK, the
US,
and Spain
took the view that all options other than the use of military force
had been
270.
A specially
convened Cabinet at 1600 on 17 March 2003 endorsed
the
decision
that the diplomatic process was now at an end and Saddam
Hussein
should be
given an ultimatum to leave Iraq; and that the House of
Commons
would be
asked to endorse the use of military action against Iraq to
enforce
compliance,
if necessary.134
271.
In his
statement to the House of Commons that evening, Mr Straw said
that the
Government
had reluctantly concluded that France’s actions had put a consensus
in
the Security
Council on a further resolution “beyond reach”.135
272.
As a result of
Saddam Hussein’s persistent refusal to meet the UN’s
demands,
the Cabinet
had decided to ask the House of Commons to support the UK’s
participation
in military
action, should that be necessary to achieve the disarmament of Iraq
“and
thereby the
maintenance of the authority of the United Nations”.
273.
Mr Straw
stated that Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer “set out the legal
basis for
the use of
force”.
274.
Mr Straw
drew attention to the significance of the fact that no one “in
discussions
in the
Security Council and outside” had claimed that Iraq was in full
compliance with
its obligations.
275.
In a statement
later that evening, Mr Robin Cook, the Leader of the House
of
Commons,
set out his doubts about the degree to which Saddam Hussein posed
a
“clear and
present danger” and his concerns that the UK was being “pushed too
quickly
into
conflict” by the US without the support of the UN and in the face
of hostility from
many of the
UK’s traditional allies.136
131
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
132
Telegram
465 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Resolution: Statement’.
133
Telegram
464 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Resolution’.
134
Cabinet
Conclusions, 17 March 2003.
135
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
17 March 2003, columns 703-705.
136
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
17 March 2003, columns 726-728.
605