4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

1. This Section addresses:

• the assessment between late July and late September 2002 of Iraq’s capabilities

and intentions to develop, produce and use chemical, biological and nuclear

weapons and ballistic missiles;

• the production of the Government dossier Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The Assessment of the British Government, which was published on

24 September; and

• Mr Blair’s statement to the House of Commons that day.

2. A significant number of the documents relevant to the events considered in this

Section are already in the public domain, including:

• documents published by the Hutton Inquiry, including the four drafts of the

dossier produced in September 2002; and

• documents released in response to FOI requests.

3. The Inquiry has examined most of the original, unredacted, versions of these

documents and, in some cases, is adding further information to that already in the public

domain. In a small number of cases, however, primarily emails given to the Hutton

Inquiry, the Government has been unable to provide copies of the original documents.

4. The roles and responsibilities of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) are addressed in Section 2.

5. The development of UK strategy during the period addressed in this Section

is addressed in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.

6. The military planning for a campaign in which chemical and biological weapons

could be used, and in particular the arrangements to provide protection for UK forces,

are addressed in Section 6.1 to 6.3.

• The urgency and certainty with which the Government stated that Iraq was a threat

which had to be dealt with fuelled the demand for publication of the dossier and led

to Mr Blair’s decision to publish it in September, separate from any decision on the

way ahead.

• The dossier was designed to “make the case” and secure Parliamentary and public

support for the Government’s position that action was urgently required to secure

Iraq’s disarmament.

• The JIC accepted ownership of the dossier and agreed its content. There is no

evidence that intelligence was improperly included in the dossier or that No.10

improperly influenced the text.

115