The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
124.
Sir Nigel
highlighted the need to focus on the timing of the MNF-I’s
eventual
withdrawal,
which would become an increasingly important issue in the run up to
the
Iraqi
election. He recommended that the UK should look at options and
feed views into
Gen Casey
and Lt Gen McColl, who intended to discuss the issue with Prime
Minister
Allawi in
the autumn.
125.
Sir Nigel
praised the skill and commitment of the UN team he met in Iraq,
but
observed
that the electoral timetable remained “incredibly tight” and that
the Iraqi public
did not yet
have any information about the election. In his view, “a broad
electoral
coalition
containing secular Shia, moderate Sunnis and Kurds is the best
guarantee,
if it wins,
of Iraq holding together in the years ahead, and of reducing
Iranian influence”.
126.
Reflecting on
the level and reliability of information available about Iraq, Sir
Nigel
wrote
“there is still a tendency … to talk things up or … take the sage
position that things
take time
and we have to be realistic”. Sir Nigel concluded the report by
saying:
“Compared
with my visit last November, the security situation has got much
worse
and there
is a greater sense of disconnect between the Green Zone and the
rest
of Iraq. It
is difficult to be sure of one’s judgements; and Iraq in any case
continues
to be the
land of lies. The interim period is inherently unstable, as we
always knew.
But
if we can
get through it and hold respectable elections on time, that would
be an
incredible
achievement; and the prognosis then should lighten.”
127.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald closed his visit report of 13 September by saying to Mr
Blair:
“To achieve
the level of engagement we need, we will need your help in
keeping
Whitehall
up to the
mark – there are definite signs of Iraq fatigue. Ditto
the
Americans.”
128.
On 14
September, Maj Gen Rollo wrote “MND (SE) continues to experience
a
period of
calm. Incidents are running at about four or five a week, the
lowest figure since
January and
February.” 58
129.
On 15
September, Mr Blair spoke by video conference to Mr Chaplin
and
Lt Gen McColl
in Baghdad.59
Lt Gen
McColl reported that he “expected to see continuing
high levels
of activity in the coming months” and that the insurgency was
becoming
better
co-ordinated with “no shortage of finance or
volunteers”.
130.
Lt Gen McColl
told Mr Blair that Iraq Security Forces would not be able to take
full
responsibility
for security before 2006. Mr Chaplin emphasised the need for
economic
and
political progress, to create a “less benign environment for the
insurgents”. Mr Blair
agreed, and
observed:
“We would
not be able to deliver on the political and economic tracks without
getting
on top of
the security situation.”
58
Minute
Rollo to CJO, 14 September 2004, ‘GOC MND (SE) – Iraq Update – 14
September 2004’.
59
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 15 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s VTC
with Baghdad’.
416