9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
503.
On 7 March, UK
forces assumed command from the Dutch battalion in
504.
Air Chief
Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy told the Inquiry that there was
“considerable
concern”
when the Dutch Government, an important contributor to MND(SE),
announced
its
intention to withdraw:
“Despite
the serious gap this would leave in the force structure, which
potentially
risked
having to be filled by the UK, the FCO (and MOD) were slow to
engage the
Dutch
diplomatically to persuade them to stay, to the extent that when
they were
eventually
engaged preparations for their departure were too far advanced
to
reverse.
Although the Australians stepped into the breach the outcome could
have
had serious
implications for the UK, which could possibly have been avoided
by
earlier and
more substantive action in Whitehall.”273
505.
Lt Gen Riley
told the Inquiry the Dutch withdrawal was disruptive for the
MNF-I.274
In his
view, the disruption was exacerbated by:
“… a great
reluctance in Foreign Office circles to admit that what the Dutch
were
saying
publicly was actually what would happen and somehow we could
persuade
them to
stay, whereas it would have been much less disruptive to have
recognised
the reality
and either talked early to the Australians, who had given
indication that
they would
be willing to help if asked, or got on and made a contingency plan
using
British
forces, which we were having to do with the help of PJHQ and
elements of
the MOD
covertly anyway.”
506.
In Baghdad,
negotiations on the formation of the ITG continued.
507.
In
conversation with President Bush on 8 March, Mr Blair said that the
US and UK
should not
seek to influence the selection of the new Government, but that
they should
try to
“shape” how it would address certain issues, such as
Iraqiisation.275
508.
On 10 March,
Mr Charles Heatly, a former Adviser to Prime Minister
Allawi,
reported to
Mr Blair that the lack of a government was:
“… down to
a combination of the Shi’a coalition list being badly divided with
no
obvious
leader … the Kurds making … unreasonable demands, and the
large
number of
groups/individuals getting involved directly or
indirectly.”276
509.
Mr Heatly
considered that protracted negotiations over the formation of the
ITG
had exposed
tensions between the political groupings in Iraq, which he thought
would
be evident
as the process of writing the Constitution got under way. He
predicted
272
Press
release MOD, 7 March 2005, ‘Dutch handover to British forces in al
Muthanna – Iraq’.
273
Statement
Torpy, 18 January 2011, page 8.
274
Public
hearing, 14 December 2009, page 8.
275
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 8 March 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 8 March’.
276
Minute
Heatly to Prime Minister, 10 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Risks and the Media
Impact’.
475