The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
indication
that we have Self‑Defence grounds for military action. We need a
second
resolution
if the first does not do the job; or at the very least we need to …
point to a
clear
Council failure to face up to its responsibilities.
“If this is
the case, there is a way of making a virtue out of necessity. If
the
Americans
jib at the need for a second resolution, the UK does not have to.
If we
stated
clearly and publicly … that we would expect the Council to meet to
discuss
any
significant Blix report of non‑co‑operation, and we … would want to
hear Council
views about
that, we would be providing a bridge between the US and
French
positions.”
443.
Sir Jeremy
explained:
“The US
would not have expressed a commitment [to a second resolution], but
the
rest of the
Council would know that a second stage was inevitable, in practice
even
for the US
unless the latter decided, improbably, to go for unilateral
military action
before Blix
had reported …
“If we were
to make this signal about future Council action, it would add
strength
to our
approach if it was we who put a second‑stage resolution on the
table …”
444.
Sir Jeremy
concluded:
“We should
in this way have put our money where our mouth is with the
Americans;
we would
solve a problem for them; we would have found a constructive way
of
telling
them that we could not go with them on a unilateral route; and we
should
have
enhanced our legal cover for the use of force.”
445.
Sir Jeremy
offered to discuss the telegram with Mr Straw on 14 October
before
he (Mr Straw)
left for Washington.
446.
There is no
record of any discussion.
447.
The telegram
was also sent to Sir David Manning and British Ambassadors
in
Washington,
Paris and Moscow.
448.
Sir
Christopher Meyer advised on 11 October that President Bush was
the
prime mover
for US policy on Iraq and he believed war would be necessary
to
eliminate
Saddam Hussein. With Congressional authorisation to use force,
he
was likely
to become “increasingly impatient and tough with the Security
Council”
and US and
UK views on what exhausting the UN process meant could
diverge.
449.
Sir
Christopher also questioned whether there would be an
“intolerable
contradiction”
between the preferred military timetable and that for
inspections.
450.
If there
was no agreement in New York and the US was faced with
acting
alone, the
UK’s position might have a decisive effect on President
Bush’s
decision.
280