Executive Summary

248. When Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the position late on 11 March, it was

clear that President Bush was determined not to postpone the start of military action.112

They discussed the impact of President Chirac’s “veto threats”. Mr Blair considered that

President Chirac’s remarks “gave some cover” for ending the UN route.

249. Reporting discussions in New York on 11 March on the draft resolution and details

of a possible “side statement”, Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised that the draft resolution

tabled by the UK, US and Spain on 7 March had “no chance ... of adoption”.113

250. In a telephone call with President Bush on 12 March, Mr Blair proposed that the

US and UK should continue to seek a compromise in the UN, while confirming that he

knew it would not happen. He would say publicly that the French had prevented them

from securing a resolution, so there would not be one.114

251. Mr Blair wanted to avoid a gap between the end of the negotiating process and

the Parliamentary vote in which France or another member of the Security Council might

table a resolution that attracted the support of a majority of the Council. That could have

undermined the UK (and US) position on its legal basis for action.

252. When he discussed the options with Mr Straw early on 12 March, Mr Blair decided

that the UK would continue to support the US.115

253. During Prime Minister’s Questions on 12 March, Mr Blair stated:

“I hope that even now those countries that are saying they would use their veto no

matter what the circumstances will reconsider and realise that by doing so they put

at risk not just the disarmament of Saddam, but the unity of the United Nations.”116

254. The FCO assessed on 12 March that the votes of the three African states were

reasonably secure but Pakistan’s vote was not so certain. It was hoped that the six tests

plus a short extension of the 17 March deadline might deliver Mexico and Chile.117

255. The UK circulated its draft side statement setting out the six tests to a meeting

of Security Council members in New York on the evening of 12 March.118

256. Sir Jeremy Greenstock told Council members that the UK “non‑paper” responded

to an approach from the “undecided six”119 looking for a way forward, setting out six

112 Letter Cannon to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversations with Bush

and Lagos, 11 March’.

113 Telegram 417 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 12 March 2003, ‘Personal Iraq: Side Statement

and End Game Options’.

114 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Telephone Conversation

with President Bush, 12 March’.

115 Public hearing, 21 January 2010, page 105.

116 House of Commons, Official Report, 12 March 2003, column 288.

117 Telegram 33 FCO London to Riyadh, 12 March 2003, ‘Personal for Heads of Mission: Iraq:

The Endgame’.

118 Telegram 429 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Side‑Statement’.

119 Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan.

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