4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
766.
Mr Cook
subsequently wrote:
“The
dossier … painted a one-sided picture … [I]t defiantly proclaimed a
certitude for
its claims
that was at odds with the nuanced tone of every JIC Assessment I
read.”
“Personally
I never doubted that No.10 believed in the threads of
intelligence
which were
woven into the dossier. But that does not alter the awkward fact
that
the
intelligence was wrong and Ministers who had applied a sceptical
mind could
have seen
that it was too thin to be a reliable base for war. No.10 believed
in the
intelligence
because they desperately wanted it to be true. Their sin was not
one
of bad
faith but of evangelical certainty. They selected for inclusion
only the scraps
of
intelligence that fitted the Government’s case. And gave them a
harder edge
than was
justifiable. The net result was a gross distortion. Although every
individual
claim could
be sourced … the overall effect was to present a false picture of
an Iraq
bristling
with real weapons of mass destruction that turned out not to
exist.”
768.
In a section
reflecting on the issues written after the conflict, Mr Cook
wrote:
“Only in
the last five days was the word Programme dropped from the
title.
The clear implication
is that No.10 wanted Parliament and public to believe that
Iraq
had actual
weapons …”
“… the most
egregious claim of all was that Saddam had attempted to
reconstitute
his nuclear
programme … The conclusion of the section on nuclear weapons is
a
masterpiece
of false suggestion.”
770.
Mr Cook
described the section in the dossier addressing what Iraq might be
able
to do if it
obtained fissile material and other essential components as “a
fanciful leap
into the
realm of fantasy”: “This language is frightening. But as evidence
that Iraq was a
threat it
is pathetic and the authors must have known it.”
771.
Mr Blair
wrote his statement himself and chose the arguments to
make
clear his
perception of the threat and why he believed that there was
an
“overwhelming”
case for action to disarm Iraq.
772.
Mr Straw,
Mr Hoon, Mr Scarlett and others were asked to identify
“any facts
that are
false and … any other essential changes that you would like to
suggest”.
773.
Parliament was
recalled from recess on 24 September to debate the case
for
effective
action in respect of the threat posed by Iraq.
263