The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
training
had not yet happened. Set against IMOD critical equipment targets
for each
division,
10th Division were:
•
99 percent
equipped in protected mobility;
•
100 percent
equipped in light weapons;
•
86 percent
equipped in body armour; and
•
84 percent
equipped in helmets.
1334.
The MOD did
acknowledge that corruption led to issued equipment being lost
but
stated:
“once equipment has been issued … there is little MND(SE) can do to
oversee
the loss or
relocation of such assets”.
1335.
On MiTTing,
the MOD stated that US MiTT plans elsewhere in Iraq saw
US
personnel
directly embedded and serving alongside their Iraqi counterparts
but the UK
approach
differed:
“UK
practice, and one we have adopted in numerous Military Assistance
Missions
around the
world, is focused on leadership and embedding UK personnel at
brigade
and
divisional level rather than in fighting units. It is possible that
our slightly
different
approach will attract criticism from the US and we will need to be
ready to
explain our
reasoning, which is, in large part, due to the different
circumstances on
the ground
in southern Iraq. 10 Division is more advanced than some Iraqi
Army
divisions
elsewhere and is already responsible for security in much of
MND(SE)
outside
Basra City. Embedded MiTTs may not, therefore be required or
wanted
much by the
Iraqi Army in Southern Iraq.”
1336.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lieutenent General Barney
White‑Spunner,
GOC MND(SE)
from February 2008, described the US approach to
MiTTing:
“It is an
embedded military training team. So what the Americans had done
with
the First
Division, and indeed with most of their formations for which they
were
responsible
in the Iraqi Army, was they had put dedicated teams into that
formation
who lived
and worked with them. So when that formation deployed … it
brought
those teams
with it.”1233
1337.
On 31 January,
the Cabinet Office circulated a paper entitled ‘Transition
in
Southern
Iraq: Progress and Plans’.1234
The paper
set out assessments and plans on
security
transition for DOP on 1 February, and is described in more detail
in Section 9.5.
On the IPS,
it stated:
“Basic
police capability has improved and the Basra IPS is on target to
achieve the
72 percent
Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA) level 2 required for
transfer
1233
Public
hearing, 7 January 2010, page 15.
1234
Paper
Cabinet Office, 31 January 2007, ‘Transition in Southern Iraq:
Progress and Plans’.
364