3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
603.
The FCO
paper did not evaluate the seriousness of either the
five
requirements
which Iraq had “Not met” or the other areas where Iraq had
only
“Partially
met” or “Not yet met” the requirement.
604.
The way in
which that intelligence was drawn on in briefings for and
statements
by
Ministers, and the withdrawal of some of the reporting in September
2004, is
addressed
in Section 4.3.
605.
OP11 of
resolution 1441 (2002) directed Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei
“to report
immediately
to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities,
as well as
any failure
by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its
obligations
regarding
inspections under this resolution”.
606.
OP12 recorded
that the Security Council had decided “to convene
immediately
upon
receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 … in
order to consider
the situation
and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council
resolutions
in order
to secure international peace and security”.
607.
The FCO paper
did not mention that OP4 of resolution 1441 required a
further
material
breach to be “reported to the Council for assessment in accordance
with
paragraphs
11 and 12” of the resolution. Nor did it contain any reference to
the Security
Council
having done so.
608.
In setting out
the analysis, there were a number of salient points the FCO
paper
did not
make, including:
•
Dr Blix
had reminded Mr Blair on 6 February that the material
described as
“unaccounted
for” in UNSCOM’s report of 1999 was not necessarily present
in
Iraq; and
that it would be “paradoxical to go to war for something that might
turn
out to be
very little”.202
•
Dr Blix
made a similar point in his report to the Security Council on 7
March.203
•
The
quantities of material described as “unaccounted for” were
estimates
extrapolated
from data in UNSCOM official records.
•
Dr Blix
had not at that point requested any interviews outside
Iraq.
He told
the Security Council on 7 March that he would be requesting
such
interviews “shortly”.
•
There had
been no problems once aircraft flights over Iraq
started.
•
UNMOVIC had
not reached a conclusion on the purpose of the test
stand
at al‑Rafah
or the L-29 RPV programme.
•
Iraq had
already destroyed 65 of the 120 short-range Al Samoud 2
missiles
it was
estimated to possess.
202
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meetings
with Blix and El-Baradei,
6 February’.
203
UN Security
Council, ‘4714th Meeting Friday 7 March 2003’
(S/PV.4714).
503