The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
591.
One of the
most difficult questions was the form that administration should
take.
Two options
had been suggested: a US military governorate (with or without a
UN
mandate);
and a UN or UN-supported transitional authority. The US preference
was
for a
military governorate.
592.
The authors
cast doubt on any analogy with the rebuilding of Germany and
Japan
after the
Second World War, but suggested that a military governorate could
have
advantages
for the UK:
“It could
guarantee US political and financial commitment to the
reconstruction
process. It
would help ensure the civil administration and security elements
of
post‑war
government remained interconnected.
“But there
are major disadvantages. It is questionable whether a military
governorate
would be
able to carry out all the tasks outlined above effectively. Much
would
depend on
who the US brought in to take on the key roles, including
civilian
personnel.
It would be essential that full attention was paid to civilian
reconstruction
tasks
…
“It is not
clear what the legal basis for a governorate would be
…
“Presentationally
a US-led military governorate would be unattractive. Even with
a
UN mandate
it would not be seen as impartial in the same way as a UN
operation.”
593.
There were two
possible models for a UN administration: a UN
transitional
authority
as in Cambodia and East Timor, or a UN-supported transitional
administration
on the
Afghanistan model. Ideally they would be endorsed by some sort of
Iraqi political
process.
The paper explained:
“Under the
Cambodia model, international personnel would take over the
main
governmental
and military/security structures, replacing the senior officials
and
running the
organisations themselves. More junior staff would remain in place
…
“We
consider the Cambodia model likely to be most appropriate for
post-Saddam
Iraq. Many
senior figures in Iraq’s bureaucracy and military are
compromised
by their
connections with Saddam’s regime, and also lower down. Rather
than
deciding
immediately after any conflict who to retain and who to push out,
it would
be neater
for the UN Transitional Authority to replace the top tier of
leadership with
international
personnel immediately.
“Once this
system was in place, the UN could then move towards the
Afghanistan
model, by
gradually re-installing senior Iraqi officials as appropriate
…”
594.
The UN
approach raised two further questions:
“a) Who
would be the domestic figurehead? … There is no obvious
candidate
amongst the
Iraqi exile/diaspora communities. It is doubtful whether
they
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