The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
(Deputy
National Security Advisor), Mr Richard Armitage (Deputy Secretary
of State)
and Mr
Frank Miller (NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms
Control).160
286.
The British
Embassy reported that Sir Kevin emphasised the need for
clarity
on aftermath
management and that Mr Wolfowitz, although he endorsed Sir
Kevin’s
view,
suggested that aftermath management was in many ways an easier
issue than
military
planning.
287.
Mr Wolfowitz
restated that position in public later in the year.161
288.
On his return,
Sir Kevin Tebbit informed No.10 of growing US resolve on
aftermath
management
and widespread recognition in Washington that the US would remain
in
Iraq for
several years after military intervention. At the same time, he
reported “an air of
unreality,
given the enormity of what is envisaged and the absence of planning
detail or
policy
framework to credibly make it happen”.162
289.
On 23 July, Mr
Blair discussed Iraq with Mr Straw, Mr Hoon, Lord
Goldsmith,
Sir Richard
Wilson, Adm Boyce, Sir Richard Dearlove, Sir Francis Richards
(Head
of
the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)), Mr
Scarlett, Mr Powell,
Baroness
Morgan (No.10 Director of Political and Government Relations), Mr
Campbell
and Sir
David Manning (see Section 3.3).163
290.
Sir David
Manning’s annotated agenda for Mr Blair indicated that there
would be
a lot
of ground to cover in a short time. It made no reference to
post-conflict issues.164
291.
Mr Rycroft’s
record of the meeting said that there had been “little
discussion in
Washington
of the aftermath” and that Mr Blair’s meeting had concluded
that
the UK needed
a fuller picture of US planning before taking any firm decisions on
its
292.
In a note
commissioning further work from the FCO, MOD and Cabinet
Office,
Mr Rycroft
recorded that Adm Boyce would send Mr Blair “full details of the
proposed
military
campaign and options for a UK contribution”.166
No work was
commissioned on
post-conflict
issues.
293.
Maj Gen Fry
raised post-conflict issues in a minute to Lt Gen Pigott on 25
July.167
Maj Gen Fry
commented that work on “post-operational” effects had focused so
far
160
Telegram
970 Washington to FCO London, 20 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Sir K Tebbit’s
Visit to Washington,
18-19
July’.
161
US
Department of Defense News Transcript, 18 December 2002,
Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz Interview
with Tom
Ricks, Washington Post.
162
Letter
Tebbit to Manning, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
163
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July’.
164
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq Meeting: 23 July:
Annotated Agenda’.
165
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July’.
166
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July: follow up’.
167
Minute Fry
to MA/DCDS(C), 25 July 2002, ‘Developing Work on UK Options for
Operations
Against Iraq.’
162