The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
695.
In a video
conference with President Bush on 25 April, Mr Blair reported
a sense
of optimism
from Iraqi politicians.334
He thought
that if strong Sunni Ministers could be
brought
into the Government there could be a real change for the better.
Once that had
happened
the US and UK would need to persuade the new Government to set out
a
forward
programme that would “make it clear to the international community
that we had
started a
new chapter”.
696.
On 27 April,
Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Mr Blair an account of his visit to
Iraq.335
Sir Nigel
wrote that:
“We are
widely seen as having played a major part in getting Sunni outreach
going.
Casey and
Zal [Khalilzad] will continue with it. I pressed them to try to
move quickly
into a
structured dialogue aimed at agreeing a ‘cease-fire’. Casey agrees
with the
aim, but is
moving cautiously.”
697.
In relation to
the new Iraqi Government, Sir Nigel assessed that: “This is – so
far –
a
real
government of national unity.”
698.
Sir Nigel set
out a package of proposed support for the new Government
including
policy
officials, press officers and advisers for the new Defence Minister
(see Section
10.2 for
further details). Sir Nigel also reported:
“I said
bluntly that we needed a right of veto over the Defence and
Interior Ministries.
This was
not contested.”
699.
Sir Nigel’s
report concluded:
“This is
the last big moment in the political timetable we created in 2004
and have,
despite all
the problems, stuck to. The next few months will decide whether
it
is possible
to form a durable and effective unity government; and whether
they
can
construct a political and security strategy which bears down
quickly on the
sectarian
violence.
“If so,
Iraq could look very different by the end of the
year.”
700.
Mr Blair
annotated Sir Nigel’s advice: “We need a lot more work on
their
programme,
the transition, and a plan of communications inside and outside of
Iraq.”
He asked
Sir Nigel to supervise that work personally.
701.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald told the Inquiry that Sunni outreach:
“… was one
of the areas where the Americans consistently thought that the UK
–
because of
history, because it was one of our political and diplomatic talents
… they
regarded it
as something where we had a voice and needed to be allowed to
get
334
Letter
Phillipson to Hayes, 25 April 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 25 April:
Middle East
issues’.
335
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 27 April 2006, ‘Visit to Iraq’
including manuscript comment Blair.
602