12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
Badr/JAM
(or tribes – that we don’t really know which is symptomatic of the
lack of
clear
knowledge on the ground) threaten to shape up for another bout;
Iranian angle
(I’ll leave
it at that) likely to become hot from early Jan with obvious risks
for Maysan
(and,
indeed Basra); and there is an ESC [Emergency Security Committee]
still in
place … To
argue forcefully for Maysan to transition in these circumstances
strikes
me as a
touch Nelsonian. Or did Strategy Group take all these factors into
account
when
deciding we should get [Dr] Rubaie to ‘press hard’ at MCNS next
week?”1398
1533.
On 25 January
2007, Mr Asquith reported that the MNF were unable to visit
police
stations in
the centre of town, and relied on police to meet them on the city
perimeter.1399
1534.
On 14 March,
the British Embassy Office Basra reported that it was continuing
to
push that
Maysan was ready for transition: “Our approach with the US – that
Maysan is
not
perfect, but it is good enough – appears to be
working.”1400
Prime
Minister Maliki had
disbanded
the Emergency Security Committee on 7 January and “sacked” the
Chief of
Police
Mr Maythem, replacing him with General Hassan.
1535.
The Embassy
stated that there was “a lot of anecdotal evidence of
arms
smuggling”
across Maysan’s border, and “regular press reports of arms
smuggling and
militants
crossing”, but no “concrete evidence”. The local Chief of the DBE
was “weak”
and the MOI
was “looking to replace him”. While there had been attempts to
close the
border and
improve infrastructure, the Iraqi Government was concerned about
the
potentially
negative impact on the local economy. MND(SE) would continue
patrolling
the border
after transition. The Embassy stated:
“The border
issue will not be easily solved; it is a source of wealth as well
as
weapons.”
1536.
On 3 May,
Mr Sheinwald reported to Mr Blair that ACM Stirrup saw no
utility in
the Maysan
border‑monitoring role.1401
It was not
preventing incoming arms, nor acting
as a
deterrent. However, ACM Stirrup did not want to “make an early
move”, given US
sensitivities
in relation to Iran.
1537.
On 4 April,
the Iraqi Government announced that Maysan would transfer to
PIC
1538.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Maj Gen Shaw described the
reason for the
decision to
transfer Maysan to PIC at that time:
“What
happened in Maysan was not that there was any blinding flash of
new
security,
but, rather, that the situation in Maysan had been stable for long
enough, in
1398
Email
Asquith to Casey, 10 December 2006, ‘IPU Priorities: Maysan/Basra
Port’.
1399
eGram
3125/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Basra:
Handling the US’.
1400
eGram
10299/07 Basra to FCO, 14 March 2007, ‘Maysan: Getting to
Provincial Iraqi Control’.
1401
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq’.
1402
eGram
14083/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 4 April 2007, ‘Government of Iraq
Announces Transition in
Maysan’.
407