1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
197.
In an
Assessment issued on 24 August, the JIC reassessed Iraq’s
capabilities
in the
light of the new information.92
198.
In relation to
Iraq’s nuclear programme, the JIC noted that Iraq:
•
“… admits
that it previously concealed the full extent of its nuclear
programme.
It has
revealed that in August 1990 it began a crash programme,
later
abandoned,
to build a nuclear programme within a year”; and
•
“… intended
to use nuclear material held under IAEA safeguards in Iraq.
The
Iraqis
claim the plan was abandoned because they concluded that the
IAEA
would
detect their activities. In fact, they had insufficient fissile
material to make
a nuclear
device. Hussein Kamil’s reported claim that, at the time of the
Gulf
Conflict,
Iraq was only three months from completing a nuclear weapon
probably
refers to
the ‘crash programme’. It is very unlikely to be
true.”
199.
In relation to
ballistic missiles, the JIC recorded that:
“UNSCOM has
verified destruction of the declared SCUDs (and the Iraqi
derivatives)
and their
launchers and believes it has a satisfactory account of what
happened to
the rest.
UNSCOM has also supervised destruction of components and much of
the
missile-related
infrastructure …”93
200.
The JIC noted,
however, that Iraq would:
“… retain a
technology and production base because UN SCR 687 allows it
to
develop and
manufacture missiles with ranges less than 150 km. But
intelligence
reports
that some current missile R&D [research and development] work
is being
hidden from
UNSCOM inspectors. Iraq has now revealed that it developed
…
SCUD-type
missile motors. This re-introduces uncertainty into an area
where
UNSCOM had
previously expressed itself to be satisfied.”
201.
In relation to
chemical weapons, the JIC concluded that it was “unlikely”
that
Iraq had “a
covert stockpile of [chemical] weapons or agent in any significant
quantity;
Hussein
Kamil claims that there are no remaining stockpiles of
agent”.94
92
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
45.
93
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
51.
94
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
47.
59