The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
three or
four advisers to support Iraqi ministries involved in SSR
(Defence,
Interior
and Justice); the UK had been asked to lead ORHA’s “Internal
Security”
cross-cutting
group; and
•
UK
secondees to strengthen each of the three (or possibly four) ORHA
regional
teams to
ensure the UK remained “fully ‘joined-up’” with all parts of
ORHA.
233.
The “shoulds”
included a UK civilian to lead the ORHA regional office
covering
central
Iraq, and advisers in the oil and finance sectors.
234.
Maj Gen Cross
advised that, if all the recommendations were
accepted,
the number
of UK staff would rise from 19 to “about 100” within an ORHA total
of
1,500 (including
force protection and support staff).
235.
On 15 April,
the IPU informed Sir Michael Jay that the Cabinet Office was
“clear”
that the
FCO should continue to lead on deployments to ORHA.140
The IPU
had
requested
extra staff to cover the “major surge of work” in managing the
secondment
of UK
officials to ORHA, and was trying to identify funding. It estimated
that the first UK
secondees
would be required by early May.
236.
Section 15
addresses the recruitment of additional UK secondees to
ORHA.
It shows
that there were no contingency preparations for the deployment of
more than
a handful
of UK civilians to Iraq and that the UK’s response was hampered by
the
absence of
cross-Whitehall co-ordinating machinery and a lack of information
about
what ORHA
needed.
237.
On 16 April,
at the request of the FCO, the JIC produced an
Assessment,
‘The initial
landscape post-Saddam’.141
The JIC
stated:
“The
situation in Iraq is complex, fast-moving and confused
…
“There has
been jubilation at the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. But we
judge
that this
is likely to dissipate quickly. Most of the Iraqi population is
ambivalent about
the role of
the Coalition and uncertain about the future. Initial reporting
shows that
concerns
arise quickly about the breakdown of law and order and the need for
food
and water.
Some pre-war reports suggested that the Iraqi population has
high,
perhaps
exaggerated, hopes that the Coalition will rapidly improve their
lives by
improving
their access to clean drinking water, electricity and sanitation.
However,
even
without any war damage, there are severe shortfalls in the
infrastructure of
these
sectors, and in healthcare. Looting has made matters worse
…
“There is
no sign yet of widespread popular support for opposition to the
Coalition.
We judge
that, at least in the short term, the details of the post-Saddam
political
process
will be less important for many Iraqis than a restoration of
internal security
140
Minute
Chatterton Dickson to PS/PUS [FCO], 15 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA:
PUS’s meeting with
Permanent
Secretaries, 16 April’.
141
JIC
Assessment, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: the initial landscape
post-Saddam’.
46